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 A PRISONERS’ CHARTER?: REFLECTIONS ON 
PRISONER LITIGATION UNDER THE CANADIAN 
CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS  
DEBRA PARKES† 
At the end of the Charter’s 20th anniversary year,1 the Supreme 
Court of Canada decided what may be its most significant 
prisoners’ rights case to date.2 By a 5 to 4 margin, the Court struck 
down a law that barred prisoners serving two years or more from 
voting in federal elections.3 The decision was heartening for 
advocates of prisoners’ rights. A majority of the Supreme Court 
held that prisoners are not second-class citizens, at least in relation 
to democratic rights. The Canadian government is not permitted to 
make prisoners “temporary outcasts from our system of rights and 
democracy.”4 However, when one looks back on nearly a quarter 
century of Charter litigation by prisoners, it is evident that 
prisoners have, in some significant ways, been treated by courts 
and legislatures as temporary outcasts from a meaningful form of 
rights protection. 
                                                          
† Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Manitoba. My grateful 
thanks are owed to the Manitoba Legal Research Institute for its support of this 
project. I also thank Kim Pate and the U.B.C. Law Review’s anonymous 
reviewers for their comments on earlier drafts, as well as Beth Tait, Ainslie 
Shroeder, Dan Rempel, and Sharon Scharfe for their research assistance at 
various stage of this article’s progress. All remaining errors and omissions are 
mine. 
1 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [Charter]. 
2 Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), 2002 SCC 68, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 
519, 218 D.L.R. (4th) 577 [Sauvé cited to S.C.R.]. 
3 Canada Elections Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-2, s. 51(e). 
4 Sauvé, supra note 2 at para. 40. 
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I am reminded of an anecdote5 related by Kim Pate, Executive 
Director of the Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies 
and a leading advocate of prisoners’ rights in Canada. Kim 
describes a phone conversation she had with a woman who was, at 
the time, incarcerated in a segregated maximum security unit 
inside a men’s prison. Kim mentioned that she was going into a 
meeting to discuss the application of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms to prison issues and the woman responded, 
“Really? Great! Do you think you will be able to get it to apply to 
us?” The fact that it had applied for fourteen years at that point 
was unknown to this woman and to many other prisoners. The 
experience of daily life in prisons and jails across this country 
belies the existence of an entrenched bill of rights, which one 
might expect, at a minimum, to act as a check on the excesses of 
state power in closed institutions. 
Michael Jackson, a law professor at the University of British 
Columbia, has said that “the principal benefit flowing from a 
constitutionally entrenched Charter of Rights and Freedoms is not 
to be found in the litigation it spawns, but rather in the climate and 
culture of respect it creates amongst both governments and 
citizens for fundamental human rights and freedoms.”6 Indeed, 
legislative changes such as the articulation of certain prisoners’ 
rights made in the 1992 federal Corrections and Conditional 
Release Act7 may have had as much, if not more impact on the 
                                                          
5 Kim Pate, 50 Years of Canada’s International Commitment to Human 
Rights: Millstones in Correcting Corrections for Federally Sentenced Women 
(Ottawa: Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies, 1998), online: 
Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies (“CAEFS”) <http://www. 
elizabethfry.ca/50years/50years.htm>. 
6 Michael Jackson, Justice Behind the Walls (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2002) at 62. 
7 Corrections and Conditional Release Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-5 [CCRA]. 
The CCRA provides that prisoners “retain the rights and privileges of all 
members of society, except those rights and privileges that are necessarily 
removed or restricted as a consequence of sentence” (s. 4(e)) and are entitled to 
“the least restrictive measures consistent with the protection of the public, staff 
members and offenders” (s. 4(d)). The CCRA also contains a number of specific 
rights to, for example, health care (ss. 85-89), religion (s. 75), grievance 
procedures (ss. 90-91), and a right to consultation concerning significant 
decisions other than those involving security (s. 74). 
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daily lives of prisoners than any decision to date by a court in a 
Charter case.8 However, internal reforms have not proven 
sufficient to bring prison conditions and practices into compliance 
with the Rule of Law. As Justice Arbour found in her 1996 Report 
of the Commission of Inquiry into Certain Events at the Prison for 
Women in Kingston, “[t]he Rule of Law is absent, although rules 
are everywhere.”9 It is for this reason that Jackson,10 Arbour, the 
Canadian Human Rights Commission11 and others have called for 
various forms of independent accountability and oversight of 
corrections in Canada, including more rigorous judicial review and 
remedies.12 
This paper examines nearly a quarter century of Charter 
litigation by prisoners, beginning with a brief consideration of the 
social and political context for prisoners into which the Charter 
was entrenched in 1982, before moving on to consider a variety of 
successful and unsuccessful prisoners’ Charter claims. In the 
process, the author briefly explores some of the ways in which the 
impact of the Charter has been diminished at the prison walls, 
such as through a lack of full and meaningful access by prisoners 
to courts or other means of independent review of prison decisions 
                                                          
8 Jackson cites, as an example, new statutory limits on the power to search 
prisoners which were structured to reflect principles articulated in Charter 
jurisprudence outside the prison context: 
The CCRA replaced the very broad and untrammeled power contained 
in the Penitentiary Service Regulations with a detailed set of provisions 
which distinguished among routine, investigative, and emergency 
search powers, established threshold criteria for each and 
differentiating among non-intrusive, strip, and body cavity searches 
(Jackson, supra note 6 at 66). 
9 The Hon. Louise Arbour, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Certain 
Events at the Prison for Women in Kingston (Canada: Public Works and 
Government Services, 1996) at 181. 
10 Michael Jackson, “The Litmus Test of Legitimacy: Independent 
Adjudication and Administrative Segregation” (2006) 48 Canadian Journal of 
Criminology and Criminal Justice 157. 
11 Canadian Human Rights Commission, Protecting Their Rights: A 
Systemic Review of Human Rights in Corrections for Federally Sentenced 
Women (Ottawa: Canadian Human Rights Commission, 2003) at 67, online: 
Canadian Human Rights Commission <http://www.chrc-ccdp.ca/pdf/reports/ 
FSWen.pdf>. 
12 See infra text accompanying notes 162-187. 
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and conditions, as well as by the persistence, at least in a 
significant number of cases, of the pre-Charter tendency toward 
paying deference to prison officials and policies in claims that do 
make it to court. Some promising developments in recent 
prisoners’ rights cases are discussed before attention is turned 
briefly to the future of prisoners’ rights claims in Canada. 
Examining the viability of judicial review as a means to foster a 
“Charter culture” within prisons and by considering the extent to 
which judges give effect in prisoner litigation to the rights and 
values enshrined in the Charter enables us to reflect on the climate 
and respect for rights in Canada, as well as the problems and 
contradictions of giving meaning to rights in a penal context. 
I. THE CHARTER’S PROMISE 
In 1982, it was reasonable to think that prisoners might benefit 
substantially from an entrenched bill of rights.13 It is difficult to 
imagine a class of people more vulnerable to majoritarian 
indifference and excesses of state power than prisoners.14 The 
strip-searching of women prisoners by male guards at the Prison 
for Women in Kingston in 1994 and subsequent illegal detention 
in segregation for many months15 is unfortunately just one 
example of the abuses of power that take place in Canadian 
                                                          
13 However, at that time, there were also those who were pessimistic about 
the likelihood that such “legalistic” change would amount to much for prisoners. 
See e.g. Christopher Millard, “The Philosophy, the Politics and the Practice of 
Prisoners’ Rights” (1982) 5 Can. Crim. Forum 11. 
14 A majority of prisoners come from disadvantaged backgrounds 
characterized by poverty, substance abuse, low levels of education, and high 
levels of depression and attempted suicide. See Canadian Centre for Justice 
Statistics, A One-Day Snapshot of Inmates in Canada’s Adult Correctional 
Facilities by David Robinson et al., vol. 18:8 (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for 
Justice Statistics, 1998) at 5. Mary Campbell has observed that incarceration 
“puts dysfunctional, unhappy, angry, occasionally mentally ill offenders together 
in close quarters, away from family and friends, with little or no privacy, branded 
with the shame of society – these are the breeding grounds for callousness at best, 
brutality at worst. ... The law serves as a crucial counter-weight to that natural 
drift.” Mary Campbell, “Revolution and Counter-revolution in Canadian 
Prisoners’ Rights” (1996) 2 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 285 at 327. 
15 Arbour, supra note 9. 
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prisons,16 usually far from the public eye. The events into which 
Justice Arbour inquired took place under a regime of newly-
legislated rights and a Charter that had been entrenched for over a 
decade, all of which point to the often troubling gap between 
legislated norms and practice.17 
Not so long ago, prisoners were treated as people without any 
rights at all. “Civil death,” the concept that prisoners lost all civil 
and property rights, was abolished by English legislation in the 
late 19th century.18 However, the 20th century pre-Charter history 
of corrections in Canada was largely characterized by a legislative 
and judicial “hands off” doctrine that entailed a broad delegation 
of power to administrative officials and a reluctance by courts to 
intervene in the affairs of prisons where prisoners claimed 
inhumane conditions or treatment.19 However, widespread rioting 
in prisons in the 1970s, combined with a growing domestic and 
international awareness of human rights, led to numerous reports, 
such as a House of Commons Report in 1977,20 which was 
damning of the Canadian prison system. The principal 
recommendation of the 1977 House of Commons Report, known 
as the MacGuigan Report, was that the Rule of Law must prevail 
inside Canadian penitentiaries. The release of the MacGuigan 
                                                          
16 The Annual Report of the Correctional Investigator provides a small 
window into uses of force, prisoner injuries, allegations of sexual harassment by 
staff, and other misconduct in federal prisons. See e.g. Annual Report of the 
Office of the Correctional Investigator of Canada, 2005-2006 (Ottawa: Office of 
the Correctional Investigator of Canada, 2006), online: The Correctional 
Investigator Canada <http://www.oci-bec.gc.ca/reports/AR200506_e.asp>. 
17 Campbell, supra note 14 at 323. 
18 Forfeiture Act, 1870 (U.K.), 33rd & 34th Vic., c. 23. Prisoner 
disenfranchisement was the last vestige of civil death in Canadian law, at least 
until the recent decision in Sauvé, supra note 2. 
19 Campbell, supra note 14 at 291-95. The few “prisoners’ rights” cases that 
made it to Canadian courts in the first 60 years of the 20th century, generally met 
with the “hands off” policy. See e.g. R. v. Huckle (1914), 19 D.L.R. 359, 23 
C.C.C. 73 (Ont. H.C.) where the Court held that prisoners were not entitled to be 
given notice of prison rules before they could be punished for breach of them. 
The prisoners’ claim to such a right of notice was a “fundamental 
misconception.” 
20 House of Commons Sub-Committee on the Penitentiary System in 
Canada, Report to Parliament (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1977), 
Sub-Committee Chair Mark MacGuigan [MacGuigan Report]. 
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Report also coincided roughly with the beginnings of a judicial 
move away from a pure “hands off” approach to judicial review of 
prisoners’ claims. The Supreme Court of Canada held that prison 
officials were bound by a procedural duty to act fairly in 
correctional decision-making,21 that prisoners had a limited right 
to privileged communication with their lawyers,22 and that 
prisoners had “residual liberty interests” as members of the 
general prison population.23 
Enter the Charter, with its explicit guarantees of freedom of 
expression, religion, association and conscience, as well as 
freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, and rights to 
equality and security of the person. Canada did not entrench 
prisoner-specific Charter rights like those contained in the South 
African Bill of Rights providing that “everyone who is detained … 
has a right to conditions of detention that are consistent with 
human dignity, including at least exercise and the provision, at 
state expense, of adequate accommodation, nutrition, reading 
material and medical treatment.”24 The significance of this 
provision is that prisoners might have greater, not lesser, rights 
than non-incarcerated citizens (such as, for example, a potentially 
more robust right to medical treatment) which presumably is based 
on a recognition of the additional responsibility assumed by the 
state when it takes physical custody of individuals.25 Nevertheless, 
                                                          
21 Martineau v. Matsqui Institution (No. 2), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 602, 106 D.L.R. 
(3d) 385. 
22 Solosky v. R., [1980]1 S.C.R. 821, 105 D.L.R. (3d) 745. 
23 In a trilogy of cases, the Supreme Court held that prisoners have certain 
procedural rights when prison officials decide to transfer them to administrative 
segregation or to high maximum security units: Cardinal and Oswald v. Director 
of Kent Institution, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 643, 24 D.L.R. (4th) 44; R. v. Miller, [1985] 
2 S.C.R. 613, 52 O.R. (2d) 585; and Morin v. Canada (National Special 
Handling Unit Review Committee), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 662, 24 D.L.R. (4th) 71. 
24 Bill of Rights, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, no. 108 
of 1996, c. 2, s. 35(2). 
25 The entrenchment of explicit rights for prisoners in South Africa is not 
surprising given the history of discriminatory use of the criminal law and 
imprisonment to suppress opposition to Apartheid, and the fact that many of the 
country’s post-Apartheid leaders were themselves former prisoners. See Pierre de 
Vos, Prisoners’ Rights Litigation in South Africa since 1994: a Critical 
Evaluation, (Research Paper No. 3) (Cape Town, South Africa: Civil Society 
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the text of the Charter provides that most key rights are held by 
“everyone” or, in the case of equality, “every individual,” meaning 
that prisoners are not excluded from their protection. Clearly, on 
paper, prisoners are not “temporary outcasts” from the Charter’s 
reach. However, the extent to which these rights on paper have 
proven amenable to enforcement in the courts must be considered. 
II. POLITICAL AND LEGISLATIVE CONTEXTS FOR 
PRISONERS’ RIGHTS CLAIMS UNDER THE CHARTER 
The number and kind of claims brought by prisoners in the post-
Charter era has increased,26 but we have not witnessed an 
avalanche of Charter claims, let alone successful ones. The 
entrenchment of the Charter, with its liberal, universal human 
rights-based approach also coincided with a popular and political 
trend toward a “new punitiveness” (i.e. popular support for longer 
sentences, “no frills” imprisonment, shaming, “three-strikes” laws 
and the like), implying a rejection of earlier penal reform 
movements27 in countries such as the U.S., Britain,28 and perhaps 
to a lesser degree, Canada.29 Through the 1980s, 1990s and into 
the twenty-first century, Canadians have been confronted regularly 
with media stories lamenting that this country has become “soft on 
                                                                                                                      
Prison Reform Initiative, 2003) at 6-8, online: Community Law Centre, 
University of the Western Cape <http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/ 
Projects/Civil-Society-Prison-Reform/publications/cspri-publications/prisoners_ 
rights_litigation_no_3.pdf>. 
26 One commentator has noted an “intense period of inmate litigation 
following the proclamation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.” 
Mary Campbell, “Gone But Not Forgotten: Should Judges Be Allowed to 
Remedy at Re-sentencing?” (2006) 48 Canadian Journal of Criminology and 
Criminal Justice 305 at 306. 
27 “Introduction” in John Pratt et al., eds., The New Punitiveness: Trends, 
Theories, Perspectives (Collumpton: Willan Publishing, 2005) at xii. 
28 David Garland, The Culture of Control (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001). 
29 Debra Parkes, “Prisoner Voting Rights in Canada: Rejecting the Notion of 
‘Temporary Outcasts’” in Christopher Mele & Teresa Miller, eds., Civil 
Penalties, Social Consequences (New York: Routledge, 2005). See also Jeffrey 
Meyer & Pat O’Malley, “Missing the punitive turn? Canadian criminal justice, 
‘balance’, and penal modernism” in Pratt, supra note 27 at 213 (for a discussion 
of how and why Canada’s criminal justice policy “cannot be subsumed under a 
general model of a global punitive turn”). 
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crime” and that prisoners are living the high life in “Club Fed”-
type prisons, with all the comforts of home.30 However, at the 
same time, we have not witnessed the kind of sustained political 
backlash against prisoner litigation itself that resulted in the 1996 
U.S. statute, the Prison Litigation Reform Act31 (“PLRA”), which 
radically reduced the rights of prisoners to bring claims to court in 
that country. 
The PLRA was enacted in response to perceptions that 
American prisoner litigation was typically frivolous and a waste of 
the courts’ time. Famously, a case that involved a prisoner 
allegedly claiming a right to creamy peanut butter, rather than 
chunky, was held up as typical of prisoner litigation.32 Armed with 
the myth of peanut butter litigation,33 the U.S. Congress passed the 
PLRA which essentially treats prisoners as a special class of 
                                                          
30 See e.g. Allison Dunfield, “Police Seek Change in Prison Policies” The 
Globe and Mail (28 August 2002), online: globeandmail.com <http://www. 
theglobeandmail.com>. 
31 Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-66 
(1996). 
32 Susan Herman, “Slashing and Burning Prisoners’ Rights: Congress and 
the Supreme Court in Dialogue” (1998) 77 Or. L. Rev. 1229 at 1296-99. 
33 The “myth of peanut butter litigation” was coined by Susan Herman, ibid. 
at 1297. See also Jon Herman, “Pro Se Prisoner Litigation: Looking for Needles 
in Haystacks” (1996) 62 Brooklyn L. Rev. 519 at 521, where Justice Herman 
discusses his research into the facts of the “peanut butter case,” showing that the 
prisoner was really complaining about the fact that the prison had incorrectly 
debited his prison account for a number of items including a jar of peanut butter 
he did not order (because it was chunky, not smooth). Other cases held up as 
typical of frivolous prisoner litigation were also revealed as inaccurately 
described or anomalous. For example, at 520, one that had been described by 
four state attorneys general in a New York Times article as prisoners suing 
“because there were not salad bars or brunches on weekends or holidays” was 
revealed by Justice Herman to involve much more serious allegations: 
In the “salad bar” case, forty-three prisoners filed a twenty-seven page 
complaint alleging major prison deficiencies including overcrowding, 
forced confinement of prisoners with contagious diseases, lack of 
proper ventilation, lack of sufficient food, and food contaminated by 
rodents. The prisoners' reference to salads was part of an allegation that 
their basic nutritional needs were not being met, and they mentioned, in 
passing, that at their prison a salad bar is available to prison guards and, 
at other state prisons, is available to prisoners. The complaint 
concerned dangerously unhealthy prison conditions, not the lack of a 
salad bar. 
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litigants who are subject to additional procedural obstacles (more 
onerous “exhaustion of administrative remedies” rules, fewer 
remedies available in successful cases) and financial obstacles 
(exclusion from filing fee exemptions as indigents, and no 
entitlement to costs in successful cases). The law also includes a 
“three strikes” provision barring prisoners from using any indigent 
provisions if they have had three or more unsuccessful complaints 
or appeals, including those dismissed on technical grounds or 
before the PLRA came into force. 
It is worth noting that instead of the legislative backlash to 
prisoners’ rights experienced in the U.S. in the 1990s, Canadian 
prisoners saw the introduction of new legislation governing 
federal prisons in 1992—the Corrections and Conditional Release 
Act (“CCRA”). The CCRA requires that federal corrections be 
administered according to a set of principles, a number of which 
are particularly important to a discussion of prisoners’ rights, 
including that the Correctional Service of Canada (“CSC”) must 
“use the least restrictive measures consistent with the protection of 
the public, staff members and offenders” (subsection 4(d)), that 
“offenders retain the rights and privileges of all members of 
society, except those rights and privileges that are necessarily 
removed or restricted as a consequence of sentence” (subsection 
4(e)), and that correctional decisions must “be made in a forthright 
manner, with access by the offender to an effective grievance 
procedure” (subsection 4(g)). The CCRA also contains a number 
of specific rights such as an unqualified right to counsel in serious 
prison disciplinary matters (although no right to legal aid), a right 
to health care, and a right to notice and/or consultation concerning 
significant decisions other than those involving security. These 
rights are more specific than Charter rights and, therefore, may be 
more amenable to judicial review.34 In addition, the office of the 
                                                          
34 For example, in a 1993 British Columbia case in which prisoners claimed 
a right to educational programs and sought an order that the CSC breached that 
right by cancelling a university education program, the British Columbia 
Supreme Court found a breach of the duty to consult found in s. 74 of the CCRA, 
but did not find a substantive right to the university education program (or any 
other particular program). The decision to cancel the program was quashed and 
the CSC was ordered to take any such decision in accordance with the CCRA (i.e. 
with the appropriate level of consultation with inmates). See William Head 
638               U.B.C. LAW REVIEW     VOL. 40:2 
 
federal ombudsperson for prisoners, the Correctional Investigator, 
originally created in 1973, has played a role in seeking to bring 
more accountability and transparency to correctional decision-
making, as well as performing the function of alerting government 
and the public to some serious abuses in the federal prison system. 
A similar overhaul and improvement of statutory rights of 
prisoners has not taken place at the provincial level, where the 
majority of prisoners are incarcerated.35 While there have been 
some amendments to provincial correctional law, such as the 
Manitoba Correctional Services Act (“CSA”)36 in 1998, the 
principles and purposes articulated in provincial corrections 
legislation are generally less ambitious than those in the federal 
CCRA. For example, the Manitoba Act does not contain specific 
entitlements such as rights to counsel, health care, and/or 
consultation found in the federal Act. At the same time, during the 
1990s, the Conservative Party in Ontario swept to power on the 
strength of its “common sense revolution” that featured, among 
other neo-liberal and neo-conservative policies, a plan to replace 
all adult jails in the province with “super jails,” some of which 
would be privatized.37 In 2004, British Columbia passed a new 
                                                                                                                      
Institution Inmate Committee et al. v. Canada (Correctional Service), 24 C.R. 
(4th) 399, 66 F.T.R. 262, [1993] F.C.J. No. 821 (T.D.). In a case where a prisoner 
claimed a right to education per se (albeit as an unrepresented litigant), his 
Charter claim was rejected. See Pawliw v. Canada, [1997] F.C.J. No. 379 (T.D.). 
For a discussion of the benefits of prisoner education programs, both to prisoners 
and to society, see Stephen Duguid, Can Prisons Work? The Prisoner as Subject 
and Object in Modern Corrections (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000). 
35 In 2003 to 2004, of all admissions to correctional services in Canada 
(including custody, probation, and community sentences), 68.7% were to 
provincial custody, while only 2.1% were to federal custody. Canadian Centre for 
Justice Statistics (Juristat), Adult Correctional Services in Canada, 2003/04, by 
Karen Beattie vol. 25:8 (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, 2005) 
[Beattie].  
36 Correctional Services Act, S.M. 1998, c. 47-Cap. 230. 
37 Kim Richard Nossal & Phillip J. Wood, “The Raggedness of Prison 
Privatization: Australia, Britain, Canada, New Zealand and the United States 
Compared” (Paper presented at the Prisons 2004 conference on Prisons and Penal 
Policy: International Perspectives, London, June 2004) at 11-12, online: Queen’s 
University <http://post.queensu.ca/~nossalk/papers/nossal_wood_prisons_0604. 
pdf>.  
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Correction Act38 and associated regulation, the Correction Act 
Regulation39 (“B.C. Regulation”) which is remarkable for its lack 
of any mention of guiding principles or prisoners’ rights. Section 
two of the B.C. Regulation, which is headed “Inmate Privileges,” 
lists as privileges such basic entitlements as “clothing, a mattress 
and bedding,” “access to personal visits,” and “access to health 
care.” Similar “tough on crime” approaches at the provincial level 
have been more common than at the federal level, at least until 
recently.40 In the current political climate, provincial and federal 
politicians undoubtedly perceive that they have nothing to win and 
everything to lose by embarking on prisoner’s rights reforms, if 
indeed, the matter crosses their minds. It is in this socio-political 
context that prisoners’ Charter claims must be considered. 
III. A BRIEF TOUR THROUGH PRISONER LITIGATION 
UNDER THE CHARTER41 
In keeping with pre-Charter trends, the most significant successes 
in prisoner litigation have come in claims for procedural, not 
substantive, rights (with the exception of prisoner voting rights, 
                                                          
38 Correction Act, S.B.C. 2004, c. 46. 
39 Correction Act Regulation, B.C. Reg. 58/2005. 
40 Since the Conservative Party formed a minority government in Ottawa in 
January 2006 it has announced its intention to be “tougher on crime” than its 
Liberal predecessors. See e.g. Kathleen Harris, “Crime Crackdown Time: Harper 
Vows to Fast-forward Government’s Popular Justice Initiatives” Calgary Sun (4 
April 2006) 7. 
41 In the interests of keeping this review of Charter litigation manageable 
and focused, cases involving the parole system have been omitted. The impact of 
the Charter in that context deserves its own study. For a discussion of the early 
years of Charter litigation concerning parole, see generally David Cole & Allan 
Manson, Release from Imprisonment: The Law of Sentencing, Parole and 
Judicial Review (Toronto: Carswell, 1990) and James O’Reilly, Prisoners as 
Possessors of Rights in Canadian Law (LL.M. Thesis, University of Ottawa, 
1989) at 135-59 [unpublished]. Some more recent discussion of specific issues 
concerning parole and the Charter can be found in Allan Manson, Patrick Healy 
& Gary Trotter, Sentencing and Penal Policy in Canada: Cases, Materials and 
Commentary (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2000) at c.19, and, for example, 
Nathan J. Whitling, “Comsa v. Canada (N.P.B.): The Right to a Timely Post-
Revocation Hearing” (2002) 40 Alta. L. Rev. 511. 
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discussed below).42 Further, the vast majority of challenges, 
particularly successful ones, have come in the federal system, 
since the relatively short-term nature of provincial detention 
makes it less likely that prisoners will be able to mount a Charter 
challenge during that time. What follows is not meant to be a 
comprehensive or empirical survey of all prisoner litigation under 
the Charter. Rather, it is an impressionistic review of cases this 
author considers significant, sometimes because of their outcome 
as positive or negative for prisoners, but more often for what they 
indicate about judicial approaches to prisoners’ rights under the 
Charter, as well as any barriers or challenges to the effective 
adjudication of prisoners’ Charter claims. 
A. SECTION 3: THE RIGHT TO VOTE 
The most successful single Charter right to be litigated by 
prisoners is section 3, the right to vote, as evidenced by two 
decades of challenges to prisoner voting bans at both the federal43 
and provincial44 level. With the Supreme Court of Canada 
decision in Sauvé,45 all prisoner disenfranchisement laws in 
Canada, save one,46 have been repealed or declared invalid.47 In 
                                                          
42 While prisoner voting is characterized here as a substantive right (rather 
than a right that concerns procedural fairness in correctional decision-making), a 
right to participate in the political process through voting is, in many ways, 
analogous to procedural rights that do not necessarily change the substantive 
outcome for a prisoner litigant. It is a classic participatory right, rather than a 
right to certain conditions or treatment. 
43 See e.g. Sauvé, supra note 2, as well as earlier cases such as Belczowski v. 
Canada, [1992] 2 F.C. 440 (C.A.), 90 D.L.R 330, aff’d [1993] 2 S.C.R. 438. 
44 See e.g. Reynolds v. British Columbia (Attorney General) (1984), 11 
D.L.R. (4th) 380, 53 B.C.L.R. 394 (C.A.); Badger v. Manitoba (Attorney 
General) (1986), 30 D.L.R. (4th) 108, 27 C.C.C. (3d) 158, (Man. Q.B.); and 
Byatt v. Dykema (1998), 158 D.L.R. (4th) 644, (sub nom. Byatt v. Alberta) 216 
A.R. 100 (Alta. C.A.). 
45 For further discussion of Sauvé and its implications, see Parkes, “Prisoner 
Voting Rights in Canada”, supra note 29 and Debra Parkes, “Ballot Boxes 
Behind Bars: Toward the Repeal of Prisoner Disenfranchisement Laws” (2004) 
13 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 71. 
46 The only remaining prisoner voting ban is found in s. 43(c) of the Alberta 
Election Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. E-1 which disqualifies all sentenced prisoners from 
voting in an Alberta election except for those serving sentences of 10 days or less 
or for the non-payment of fines. The government of Alberta has demonstrated a 
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Sauvé, a majority of the Court found that the government’s 
objectives for disenfranchising citizen prisoners,48 namely 
enhancing civic responsibility and providing additional 
punishment, were too vague and symbolic to justify limiting the 
right to vote. The majority rejected the government’s attempts to 
justify the voting ban in a remarkably robust fashion which 
included, for example, calling the government’s arguments a 
“façade of rhetoric.”49 
The strong language used to denounce both the rights violation 
and its attempted justification in Sauvé sets that decision apart 
from the majority of prisoners’ rights cases, such as those 
involving legal rights guaranteed by sections 7 and 8, where 
justifications based on institutional security and deference to 
prison decision-making tend to be decisive. In Sauvé, the 
government simply could not demonstrate any “specific problem 
or concern” to which the voting ban was directed.50 Yet keeping in 
mind the differences between the voting rights context and most 
other prisoners’ rights cases, there remain some potentially 
significant aspects of the decision for the future of prisoner 
litigation under the Charter which will be considered later in this 
paper. They include the Supreme Court of Canada’s robust section 
1 justification analysis, its clear rejection of the idea of automatic 
deference for penal decisions and its strong statement that the 
Charter rights of prisoners are just that—rights, not privileges. 
                                                                                                                      
strong commitment to preserving its prisoner voting ban. See Promoting 
Responsible Citizenship, Report to the Minister of Justice by the MLA Committee 
Making Recommendations on Restrictions on Prisoner Voting in the Alberta 
Election Act (Edmonton: Alberta Justice, 1998), online: Alberta Justice 
<http://www.justice.gov.ab.ca/downloads/documentloader.aspx?id=45189>. The 
constitutionality of the Alberta law has not yet been considered in light of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Sauvé. 
47 See e.g. Canadian Press, “A bill introduced Friday in New Brunswick will 
allow inmates to vote in provincial elections” New Brunswick Telegraph-Journal 
(4 April 2003). 
48 The right to vote in s. 3 of the Charter is limited to Canadian citizens. 
49 Sauvé, supra note 2 at para. 52. 
50 Ibid. at para. 21, McLachlin C.J.C. 
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B. SECTION 7: THE RIGHT TO LIFE, LIBERTY AND SECURITY OF 
THE PERSON 
Section 7 is the most heavily litigated section of the Charter by 
prisoners, most often as a basis for procedural rights claims, but 
also occasionally to make substantive rights claims.51 Many cases 
involve the requirements of procedural fairness and safeguards in 
prison decisions implicating the liberty interests of prisoners (i.e. 
disciplinary hearings in which prisoners can lose earned remission 
or face time in segregation), while a few cases involve allegations 
that prisoners’ rights to security of the person are violated by 
practices such as double-bunking or random urinalysis. I will 
begin with an analysis of the procedural rights cases. 
1. SECTION 7 AND PROCEDURAL RIGHTS 
Section 7 of the Charter has been interpreted to provide prisoners 
with some procedural rights in relation to prison disciplinary 
hearings, involuntary transfers, and other significant correctional 
decisions. For example, in Pickard v. Mountain Institution where a 
disciplinary charge was not fully particularized and where the 
Independent Chairperson relied on hearsay and the testimony of 
“unidentified speakers,” Strayer J. quashed the conviction for 
possession of contraband and ordered a rehearing.52 Prisoners have 
also, on occasion, successfully argued in Federal Court53 or 
                                                          
51 The prevalence of s. 7 cases concerned with procedural rights is not 
unique to the prison context, but is a trend in the s. 7 jurisprudence more broadly. 
For example, the argument that s. 7 includes a substantive, positive right to a 
basic level of social assistance as part of its protection of “security of the person” 
was rejected by a majority of the Supreme Court in Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney 
General), 2002 SCC 84, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429, 221 D.L.R. (4th) 257 [Gosselin 
cited to S.C.R.]. Chief Justice McLachlin stated, at para. 77, “the dominant strand 
of jurisprudence on s. 7 sees its purpose as guarding against certain kinds of 
deprivations of life, liberty and security of the person, namely, those ‘that occur 
as a result of an individual’s interaction with the justice system and its 
administration’,” although she left open the possibility that s. 7 might one day be 
interpreted to include positive state obligations.  
52 Pickard v. Mountain Institution (1994), 30 C.R. (4th) 399, (sub nom. 
Pickard v. Mountain Institution Disciplinary Court (Independent Chairperson)) 
75 F.T.R. 147 (T.D.). 
53 Storry v. William Head Institution, 139 F.T.R. 122, [1997] F.C.J. No. 
1768 (T.D.). The application was allowed where the Court found the transfer 
2007 A PRISONERS’ CHARTER? 
 
 
 
643
provincial superior courts54 that their section 7 rights were violated 
in decisions to involuntarily transfer them to higher security 
institutions. In one case, the Court noted that while the general 
climate in society is against prisoners’ rights, the Court could not 
allow that atmosphere to influence the outcome of the prisoner’s 
request for judicial review.55 In DeMaria v. Canada (Regional 
Transfer Board and Warden of Joyceville Institution),56 Reed J. 
held that section 7 requires, in addition to procedural fairness, 
“that decisions not be made in an unreasonable or arbitrary 
manner.” This means that prisoners must be given an opportunity 
to know the essence of the allegations against them and must be 
given sufficient information to respond to those allegations. In that 
case, DeMaria had been transferred from medium to maximum 
security because he was overheard making a call to his member of 
parliament. However, it has been suggested by Wayne MacKay 
that these cases are “the exceptions which prove the rule. In 
general, the rule is that courts regard the transfer of a prison 
inmate from one institution to another as the classic example of an 
administrative decision which the courts should leave to the 
bureaucrats on the front lines.”57 
These procedural fairness cases can be seen as an extension of 
the broader pre-Charter common law trend toward greater 
procedural protections in administrative decision-making, and 
more specifically, the trend toward greater procedural protections 
in the prison context. For example, since 1980, disciplinary 
tribunals in federal maximum and medium security penitentiaries 
have been staffed by Independent Chairpersons from outside the 
                                                                                                                      
decision patently unreasonable. CSC officials relied on the word of an informant 
who had earlier recanted similar allegations against another prisoner. 
54 Fitzgerald v. William Head Institution, [1994] B.C.J. No. 1534, [1994] 
B.C.W.L.D. 1982 (S.C.) [Fitzgerald cited to B.C.J.]. The petition for habeas 
corpus brought in provincial superior court was allowed where the Court found 
the CSC decision to be “extremely arbitrary and unfair” to the prisoner and, as 
such, patently unreasonable. The prisoner was not permitted to know the identity 
of the informant who alleged that he was planning an escape. 
55 Ibid. at para. 64. 
56 DeMaria v. Canada (Regional Transfer Board and Warden of Joyceville 
Institution), [1988] 2 F.C. 480, 62 C.R. (3d) 248 at 254 (F.C.T.D.). 
57 A. Wayne MacKay, “Inmates’ Rights: Lost in the Maze of Prison 
Bureaucracy?” (1988) 11 Dal. L. J. 698 at 702. 
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Correctional Service, rather than by guards or other correctional 
staff. This reform was implemented as a result of 
recommendations made by two Parliamentary committees,58 
which echoed a recommendation initially made by Professor 
Michael Jackson in 1974.59 These reports concluded that a 
disciplinary process in which correctional staff were both accusers 
and adjudicators simply could never offer fairness to prisoners, let 
alone the appearance of fairness. According to Jackson, the 
overarching flaw in the warden’s court system was that the very 
people responsible for maintaining the good order of the 
institution were the ones judging whether prisoners had committed 
offences against that good order. The judges, in other words, were 
the offended parties. Furthermore, in most cases these adjudicators 
brought considerable personal knowledge of the prisoners to the 
hearings based on their previous dealings with them, and it was 
therefore impossible for the adjudicators to approach a particular 
case free of that bias in such a context.60 
While Jackson’s Justice Behind the Walls documents some of 
the complaints that both prisoners and guards continue to have 
about the conduct of disciplinary hearings by Independent 
Chairpersons, his conclusion is that, on balance, the practice of 
having Independent Chairpersons has improved the level of 
fairness, impartiality, and consistency in disciplinary proceedings 
in federal penitentiaries. 
Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for provincial 
disciplinary processes across the country. While the practice of 
having independent adjudicators in the federal system has been 
codified in the Corrections and Conditional Release Act and its 
regulations, this author is not aware of any provinces that have 
followed suit. In British Columbia,61 Theodore Allard, a prisoner 
serving provincial time, asked the provincial superior court to find 
                                                          
58 MacGuigan Report, supra note 20 and Report of the Study Group on 
Dissociation (Ottawa: Solicitor General of Canada, 1975] Chair: James A. 
Vantour. 
59 Michael Jackson, “Justice Behind the Walls: A Study of the Disciplinary 
Process in a Canadian Penitentiary” [1974] 12 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1. 
60 Jackson, Justice Behind the Walls, supra note 6 at 190. 
61 Allard v. Nanaimo Correctional Centre, 2000 BCSC 1159, [2000] B.C.J. 
No. 1602 (S.C.) [Allard cited to BCSC]. 
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the regulations governing provincial disciplinary hearings to be 
contrary to section 7 of the Charter, primarily on the ground that 
they provided for adjudication by prison officials and not 
independent decision-makers. In this case, Holmes J. found that 
serious breaches of natural justice had been committed by the 
institutional decision-maker. These breaches included the prisoner 
being asked to leave the room to permit confidential information 
being read into the record, the tape recording of the hearing 
containing a three minute blank space during this time, and the 
prisoner being prevented from calling witnesses because the 
adjudicator believed that the prisoners had probably collaborated 
on a story. However, while the decision itself was quashed, the 
Court found the Charter issue moot since the prisoner had since 
been released and was credited with his lost earned remission 
time.62 
In a Manitoba case involving a provincial disciplinary hearing 
that navigated a variety of procedural barriers, the Court found in 
favour of the prisoner’s section 7 Charter claim, quashing the 
decision of a prison disciplinary board.63 The Court held that the 
chairperson of the disciplinary board, who was the Deputy 
Superintendent of the prison, had committed a number of breaches 
of natural justice. The Court held that: 
when the chairperson of the discipline board explains to the board the 
evidence from his perspective; when no opportunity is afforded 
counsel to cross-examine witnesses or otherwise challenge evidence 
upon which the board obviously relied; when the chairperson gives 
evidence, albeit unsworn, to the board, I think any reasonable person 
would have serious, legitimate questions about the impartiality of the 
board.64 
While the disciplinary decision was quashed, it does not appear 
that this case has led to systemic improvements in procedural 
fairness for provincial prisoners in Manitoba. It would appear that 
disciplinary proceedings in Manitoba jails continue to operate in a 
                                                          
62 Ibid. at paras. 30, 31, 43, 44.  
63 R. v. Brown and Hunter (29 November 1990), Winnipeg 90-02-00045 
(Man. Q.B.) [on file with author], summarized in (1991) 21 C.R.D. 300-03, 13 
W.C.B. (2d) 221. 
64 Ibid. at 7. 
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manner not unlike that documented in this 1990 decision, despite 
proclamation of a new CSA and associated regulation65 in 1999. 
For example, the “discipline board” is composed of correctional 
officers in the same institution (although they must not be those 
involved in the incident at issue)66 and no right to counsel is even 
mentioned for those hearings which might qualify as “serious 
disciplinary proceedings” engaging a right to counsel under the 
reasoning of the Supreme Court in Howard,67 discussed below. 
Instead, the Manitoba Regulation simply allows that a prisoner 
“may request the assistance of a person of the inmate's choice who 
in the opinion of the chair of the discipline board, is reasonably 
available and would not present a security concern.”68 
In Howard, the Federal Court of Appeal held that the section 7 
right not to be deprived of life, liberty or security of the person 
except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice, 
entails a right to be represented by counsel at certain prison 
disciplinary hearings. The right to counsel in proceedings where 
prisoners could lose earned remission or be placed in solitary 
confinement was deemed necessary to insure a fair hearing. 
Justice MacGuigan69 in Howard commented on the need for 
judicial inquiry into the procedural rights and protections afforded 
to prisoners. He held that courts should not micro-manage the 
administration of prisons, but neither should they allow prison 
authorities to operate on principles of convenience, necessity and 
their own “expertise.” In his reasoning, Justice MacGuigan held 
that, “[a]ll that is not immediately necessary must certainly yield 
to the fullest exigencies of liberty.”70 
                                                          
65 Correctional Services Regulation, Man. Reg. 128/99 [Manitoba 
Regulation]. 
66 Ibid., ss. 9(1), 9(3)(a). 
67 Howard v. Presiding Officer of the Inmate Disciplinary Court of Stony 
Mountain Institution, 45 C.R. (3d) 242, [1984] 2 F.C. 642 [Howard cited to 
F.C.]. The federal government’s appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was 
quashed as moot: [1987] 2 S.C.R. 687. 
68 Manitoba Regulation, supra note 65, s. 12(c). 
69 MacGuigan J. was well-versed in these issues, having previously chaired 
the House of Commons Sub-Committee on the Penitentiary System in Canada, 
supra note 20, in which a chief finding was the absence of the rule of law inside 
prison walls. 
70 Howard, supra note 67 at 682. 
2007 A PRISONERS’ CHARTER? 
 
 
 
647
While there is a right to representation by counsel at important 
prison disciplinary hearings (now codified in regulations71 under 
the CCRA for federal prisoners), that right may be more illusory 
than real. Neither the Supreme Court nor any lower court in 
Canada has recognized a Charter right to publicly-funded legal aid 
for prison disciplinary matters. The vast majority of prisoners are 
poor and cannot afford to retain a lawyer. Therefore, without 
access to legal aid, most prisoners cannot enforce any right they 
may have to legal representation. A study by Professor Michael 
Jackson estimated that between 1993 and 1999, less than one 
percent of male prisoners facing disciplinary hearings in British 
Columbia’s maximum and medium security federal penitentiaries 
were represented by counsel.72 This finding is perhaps 
unsurprising given that a 2003 study commissioned by the federal 
Department of Justice found legal aid coverage for prisoners 
across the country to be woefully inadequate to meet the access to 
justice needs of federal prisoners who suffer serious consequences 
without legal assistance.73 However, one might have expected that 
the rate of legal representation in disciplinary hearings in B.C. 
would have been higher. Unlike the situation in other provinces, at 
the time of the Department of Justice study, B.C. had a dedicated 
legal aid office for prisoners, located near the federal prisons 
where Jackson’s study was conducted. 
In 1999, the Supreme Court of Canada in Winters74 held that 
there was a statutory right under the British Columbia Legal 
Services Society Act to “legal services.” This statutory right to 
legal services was found in connection with the prison disciplinary 
                                                          
71 Corrections and Conditional Release Regulations, S.O.R./92-620, s. 31(2) 
provides that “[t]he service shall ensure that an inmate who is charged with a 
serious disciplinary offence is given a reasonable opportunity to retain and 
instruct legal counsel for the hearing, and that the inmate’s legal counsel is 
permitted to participate in the proceedings to the same extent as an inmate 
pursuant to subsection (1).” 
72 Jackson, Justice Behind the Walls, supra note 6 at 277. 
73 Department of Justice Canada, Study of the Legal Services Provided to 
Penitentiary Inmates by Legal Aid Plans and Clinics in Canada (Ottawa: 
Department of Justice Canada, 2002), online: Department of Justice Canada 
<http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/ps/rs/rep/2003/rr03lars-10/index.html>. 
74 Winters v. Legal Services Society, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 160, 66 C.R.R. (2d) 
241. 
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hearing of Arthur Winters, where the punishment upon conviction 
was solitary confinement. However, the instability of such a 
statutory right was clearly demonstrated in B.C. in recent years 
when legal aid cuts forced the closure of the Prisoners’ Legal 
Services legal aid clinic. Some prisoner legal services are now 
being provided through a not-for-profit society, the West Coast 
Prison Justice Society, which receives a minimal level of legal aid 
funding to provide services only “as required under the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.”75 The Canadian Bar 
Association (“CBA”) has launched a Charter challenge on the 
basis that inadequate funding of legal aid in B.C. violates various 
Charter rights of poor people.76 However, that claim was recently 
struck on the grounds that the CBA has no standing to bring the 
claim and because the claim fails to disclose a reasonable cause of 
action pursuant to any of the constitutional provisions pleaded.77 It 
remains to be seen if a solution to the lack of legal aid for 
prisoners, in particular, can be found in the courts,78 since a 
political solution seems unlikely at present. The reality is that 
without adequate legal aid funding, prisoners simply do not have 
                                                          
75 See Legal Services Society of British Columbia, Fact Sheet (Vancouver: 
Legal Services Society of British Columbia, 2007), online: Legal Services 
Society of British Columbia <http://www.lss.bc.ca/assets/newsroom/fact_sheets/ 
LSS_servicessummary.pdf>. 
76 See resources concerning this legal challenge, online: Canadian Bar 
Association <http://www.cba.org/CBA/Advocacy/legalAid>. 
77 Canadian Bar Association v. British Columbia, 2006 BCSC 1342, [2006] 
B.C.J. No. 2015 (S.C.). 
78 It would be open to a court to find in a prisoners’ case that the combined 
impact of previous decisions such as Rowbotham and J.G. amounts to a right to 
publicly-funded legal aid where a prisoner will not receive a fair disciplinary 
hearing without representation by counsel. In R. v. Rowbotham (1988), 63 C.R. 
(3d) 113, 41 C.C.C. (3d) 1 [Rowbotham], the Ontario Court of Appeal held that 
accused persons have a right to legal aid where the Court determines that they 
will not receive a fair trial without representation by counsel. In New Brunswick 
(Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G.(J.), 26 C.R. (5th) 203, [1999] 
3 S.C.R. 46 [J.G.], the Supreme Court of Canada held that a mother facing the 
apprehension of her child by the province was entitled to publicly-funded legal 
aid as part of her s. 7 right to security of the person. In a future case brought by a 
prisoner, it is conceivable that a court could order legal aid to be provided to the 
prisoner as the remedy under s. 24(1) for a breach of s. 7 of the Charter. 
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meaningful access to the courts to enforce the Charter in Canada’s 
prisons. 
2. SECTION 7 AND SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS 
Section 7 of the Charter has had relatively little impact on 
prisoners outside the procedural rights context. For example, the 
practices of double-bunking79 and compulsory urinalysis without 
individualized suspicion80 have been found not to violate 
prisoners’ section 7 right to security of the person. On the other 
hand, a potentially significant section 7 case involving prisoners’ 
access to health care was settled before a trial decision could be 
rendered.81 Barry Strykiwsky, a prisoner at Stony Mountain 
Institution in Manitoba sought a declaration that the CSC’s refusal 
to provide methadone treatment for his heroin addiction violated 
his rights under sections 7, 12, and 15 of the Charter.82 He sought 
an order that the CSC had a legal duty to provide methadone 
treatment to him and to all medically-eligible prisoners who 
                                                          
79 Piche v. Canada (Solicitor General) (1984), 17 C.C.C. (3d) 1, aff’d 
(1989), 47 C.C.C. 495 (C.A.) [Piche]; Williams v. Canada (Commissioner of 
Corrections), [1993] F.C.J. No. 646 (T.D.); Protective Custody Inmates, Kent 
Institution v. Kent Institution, 2 W.D.C.P. (2d) 193, [1991] F.C.J. No. 221 (T.D.); 
and Sweet v. Canada (1999), 249 N.R. 17, [1999] F.C.J. No. 1539 (C.A.), all of 
which were unsuccessful. However, there may be circumstances where a prisoner 
can establish that he or she will be personally affected by a policy of double-
bunking. See e.g. R. v. K.R.P., [1994] B.C.J. No. 2405 (Prov. Ct.) where the 
Court said that: 
double bunking as it is practiced at [Prince George Regional Correctional 
Centre], based on the evidence before me, is not acceptable treatment. It 
borders on outrageous and cannot be condoned by the Courts ... Government 
must provide sufficient financial resources to prisons to avoid double 
bunking. As to Mr. P., although I am not satisfied on the evidence that he has 
been, or will be, subjected to cruel and unusual treatment, I direct that he be 
housed in a cell where there is no double bunking. 
80 Fieldhouse v. Canada (1995), 40 C.R. (4th) 263, 98 C.C.C. (3d) 207 
(B.C.C.A.). 
81 Strikiwsky v. Stony Mountain Institution, 193 F.T.R. 59, [2000] F.C.J. No. 
1404 (T.D.). 
82 The claim also relied on s. 86 of the CCRA, supra note 7, which requires 
CSC to provide every prisoner with “(a) essential health care; and (b) reasonable 
access to non-essential mental health care that will contribute to the inmate’s 
rehabilitation and successful reintegration into the community.” 
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wished to have that treatment. In the settlement, the CSC 
acknowledged that prisoners with opiate addictions have a “right 
to receive methadone maintenance treatment as essential health 
care” in accordance with a set of new treatment guidelines.83 The 
settlement was significant because it applied to the whole class of 
prisoners represented by Strikiwsky. Therefore, instead of granting 
one particular prisoner access to methadone treatments, the 
settlement involved a significant policy change to prison health 
care treatment generally.84 
In a recent section 7 case,85 the Alberta Court of Queen’s 
Bench declared that limiting remand prisoners’ phone access to 
only collect calls violated their section 7 liberty right to a fair trial 
in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice, as well as 
the presumption of innocence guaranteed by subsection 11(d). The 
decision is significant for its consideration of the way that prison 
rules and decisions may affect remand prisoners and sentenced 
prisoners differently, as well as for the way in which it addresses 
the objection that section 7 does not protect purely “economic 
interests.”86 Distinguishing two previous decisions by the Federal 
Court that had rejected section 7 challenges to prison telephone 
restrictions, the Court held: 
                                                          
83 See Courting Rights: Case Studies in Litigating the Human Rights of 
People Living with HIV (Toronto: Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network, 2006), 
online: Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network <http://www.aidslaw.ca/ 
publications/interfaces/downloadFile.php?ref=1013>. 
84 See also an interlocutory decision of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench 
allowing a provincial prisoner’s application for medical treatment (pain 
medication) pending trial on the issue of his right to adequate medical care in 
prison: Geary v. Alberta (Edmonton Remand Centre), 2004 ABQB 19, [2004] 5 
W.W.R. 634. 
85 Criminal Trial Lawyers’ Assn. v. Alberta (Solicitor General), 2004 ABQB 
534, [2004] A.W.L.D. 526 (Q.B.) [Criminal Trial Lawyers]. 
86 In Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, 58 
D.L.R. (4th) 577 [Irwin Toy cited to S.C.R.], the Supreme Court of Canada held 
that the economic interests of a corporation were not protected by s. 7, but said 
that it would be “precipitous” to exclude from the Charter economic rights such 
as those guaranteed in international human rights documents (at para. 95). 
However, litigation brought by low-income Canadians challenging restrictive 
social assistance laws as violations of Charter rights have met with little success. 
See e.g. David Wiseman, “The Charter and Poverty: Beyond Injusticiability” 
(2001) 51 U.T.L.J. 425. 
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The effect of limits on a remand prisoner's ability to raise bail and 
locate potential witnesses may be much more direct and dramatic 
than that created by a requirement of collect telephone calls from 
serving prisoners. Those persons have already been convicted; raising 
bail is not an issue they face, nor is the need to contact witnesses for 
trial. In comparison, the effect on remand prisoners, to the extent it 
limits their right to apply for bail or secure defense evidence for trial, 
directly impacts upon their ability to obtain release pending trial, and 
to defend themselves at trial.87 
This difference transforms the issue from an economic one into 
a question of liberty. Under the operation of the new telephone 
system it is not the prisoner’s ability to pay the cost of a local 
collect telephone call which is at issue, but rather the prisoner’s 
inability to fully pursue opportunities to obtain release from 
custody or mount a defence at trial. The fact that economic 
limitations on the part of the recipient of the calls may be the 
immediate cause of the problem does not transform the issue into 
an economic one.88 
The Court clearly focused on the fact that this restriction 
affected remand prisoners in a way that had an impact on their 
right to a fair trial. It remains to be seen whether other cases 
involving the rights of remand prisoners will achieve similar 
success.89 
C. SECTION 8: RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM UNREASONABLE 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
From strip searches to reading mail to taping telephone calls, 
courts have generally dismissed allegations that prison officials 
violated prisoners’ section 8 right to be free from unreasonable 
                                                          
87 Criminal Trial Lawyers, supra note 85 at para. 75. 
88 Irwin Toy, supra note 86 at paras. 75-76. 
89 An omnibus Charter challenge to remand conditions at the Edmonton 
Remand Centre is ongoing in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench, after 
surviving numerous motions, including one to dismiss the action as moot, which 
was rejected by the Court of Queen’s Bench: Trang v. Alberta (Edmonton 
Remand Centre), 2004 ABQB 497, [2004] A.J. No. 796 [Trang Alta. Q.B. cited 
to A.J.] and Alberta Court of Appeal: 363 A.R. 167, [2005] A.J. No. 157 [Trang 
C.A. cited to A.J.], leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, 346 N.R. 194, [2005] 
S.C.C.A. No. 161. 
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search or seizure. Most of these cases do not proceed to the section 
1 justification stage because the courts tend to find that the 
penitentiary context, by its very nature, leads to a diminished 
expectation of privacy, rendering virtually any search 
reasonable.90 For example, in Warriner v. Kingston Penitentiary,91 
the Federal Court found no violation of section 8 where a prisoner 
was ordered to strip and “bend over” in order to allow a visual 
inspection of his anal cavity after a contact visit with his wife. The 
Court also rejected an argument that the humiliation and 
degradation caused by the “bend over” order amounted to a 
violation of prisoners’ security of the person contrary to section 7 
of the Charter. 
However, in a few cases, courts have found that certain 
searches and seizures within prisons violate section 8 rights, 
leading to a remedy under subsection 24(2) of the Charter where 
the prisoner is awaiting trial. In R. v. Williamson,92 the Court 
found that a policy of universally taping prisoners’ telephone calls 
was an unreasonable search and seizure, and that evidence 
obtained from the taped phone calls was inadmissible against the 
accused. On the other hand, in R. v. Lamirande,93 the Manitoba 
Court of Appeal distinguished and disagreed with Williamson, 
finding no violation of section 8 where correctional officials had 
seized personal notes from a prisoner and sought to use them in a 
prosecution against her. The prisoner was said to have no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to the personal notes 
and diaries. Similarly, in R. v. Sutherland,94 a prisoner’s diaries 
were seized by correctional officials and used in a dangerous 
offender hearing. Whether considered at the section 8, 1 or 
subsection 24(2) stage, the fact that prison officials have 
                                                          
90 In Weatherall v. Canada (Attorney General) (1993), 23 C.R. (4th) 1, 
[1993] 2 S.C.R. 872 [Weatherall cited to S.C.R.], the Supreme Court held that 
the reasonable expectation of privacy, which is the basis for the s. 8 right, is 
much lower in prison than in the outside community. 
91Warriner v. Kingston Penitentiary, [1991] 2 F.C. 88, 39 F.T.R. 285, 
[1991] F.C.J. No. 1116 (T.D.). 
92 R. v. Williamson (1998), 2 C.R.R. (2d) 277, 123 C.C.C. (3d) 540 (Alta. 
Q.B.). 
93 R. v. Lamirande, 2002 MBCA 41, [2002] M.J. No. 133. 
94 R. v. Sutherland, 120 Man. R. (2d) 125, [1997] M.J. No. 390 (Q.B.). 
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legitimate security concerns related to contraband, potential 
escapes or the commission of other offences within prisons looms 
large in these cases and thus, the Charter right against 
unreasonable search and seizure has had relatively little impact on 
the lives of prisoners. 
D. SECTION 2: FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS OF EXPRESSION AND 
RELIGION 
Prisoners’ claims based on freedom of expression have also been 
largely unsuccessful. Perhaps not surprisingly, Clifford Olson, a 
notorious prisoner serving a sentence for multiple first degree 
murders, lost a challenge to an administrative rule limiting his 
access to the media.95 The policy of limiting Olson’s media access 
constituted a violation of his freedom of expression (the Crown 
conceded this point), but the policy was saved by section 1 and 
was found to minimally impair Olson’s expressive rights. 
According to the Court, Olson was permitted to express himself in 
a variety of ways; he was just not allowed to express himself to the 
media. At least two pressing and substantial objectives were 
found, namely facilitating Olson’s rehabilitation through reducing 
his notoriety, as well as limiting the security risk Olson posed in 
the institution. 
That is not to say that there have been no successful free 
speech cases. In a 1997 Federal Court decision,96 one aspect of the 
CSC’s telephone access policy (Commissioner’s Directive 085) 
was found to unjustifiably infringe prisoners’ freedom of 
expression. The contested elements of the policy included: a limit 
of 40 telephone numbers that each prisoner was permitted to call 
(plus common access numbers such as legal aid, politicians, and 
senior government officials), the recording and/or monitoring of 
telephone calls, and a “voice-over” message advising all telephone 
call recipients that “this call is from a correctional institution. This 
call may be monitored or recorded.” The policy was upheld (as a 
                                                          
95 Olson v. Canada (1996), 34 C.R.R. (2d) 1, [1996] 2 F.C. 158 (T.D.). 
96 Hunter v. Canada (Commissioner of Corrections) (1997), 9 C.R. (5th) 
120, [1997] F.C.J. No. 959 (T.D.). 
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violation of subsection 2(b) justified by section 1)97 except for the 
voice-over part of the policy, which was not justified by section 
1.98 
The CSC’s objectives were found to be pressing and 
substantial: (1) to enhance inmate telephone communication with 
family and other significant community members to promote 
rehabilitation and (2) to control inmate communications that might 
result in the commission of a crime. The voice-over (“forced 
speech”) aspect of the policy failed the “minimal impairment” 
branch of the section 1 Oakes test.99 The Court considered it 
“patently intrusive” and not necessary to achieve the rehabilitative 
or precautionary objectives of the policy. The Court extended an 
interlocutory injunction granted with respect to the voice-over 
policy, which prohibited the CSC from using the voice-over 
feature. However, it is important to note that subsection 2(b) of the 
Charter has been interpreted in a very expansive fashion, with all 
the doctrinal and analytical “work” being done at the section 1 
justification stage.100 A rigorous section 1 analysis in a freedom of 
expression case (whether the litigant is a prisoner or anyone else) 
will not necessarily translate into the analysis of other Charter 
rights. 
The only reported freedom of religion cases relate to limited 
religious services provided to remand prisoners101 and a claim that 
                                                          
97 The plaintiffs also unsuccessfully argued that the policy violated ss. 7 and 
8 of the Charter. 
98 There are other cases involving prisoners’ access to telephones. For 
example, in Alcorn v. Canada (Commissioner of Corrections), 2002 FCA 154, 
[2002] F.C.J. No. 620, the Federal Court of Appeal found no violation of 
prisoners’ rights under ss. 7, 10(b), and 15 of the Charter when the CSC 
instituted its Millennium Telephone System which increased the cost of local 
calls to two dollars (from twenty-five cents or free). 
99 R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103. 
100 Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, Student Edition 2005 
(Toronto: Carswell, 2005) at 952. 
101 Maltby v. Saskatchewan (1982), 143 D.L.R. (3d) 649, [1982] S.J. No. 
871 (Q.B.). This allegation was part of an omnibus Charter challenge to remand 
prison conditions, brought within the first year of the Charter. The Court found 
no violation of s. 2(a) of the Charter. But see R. v. Chan, 387 A.R. 123, [2005] 
A.J. No. 1118 (Q.B.) where a sentencing judge found that a remand prisoner’s s. 
2(a) freedom of religion was unjustifiably infringed by failing to meet his 
religious-based request for a vegetarian diet. The remedy was a judicial 
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a prison smoking ban infringed the rights of Aboriginal prisoners 
to practice their religion (tobacco being an important part of the 
religious practice of many Aboriginal groups).102 However, 
relatively recently a freedom of conscience103 case was successful 
in Federal Court. In Maurice v. Canada (Attorney General),104 a 
self-represented prisoner successfully argued that his freedom of 
conscience was unjustifiably infringed by a correctional policy to 
deny vegetarian meals unless the vegetarianism was linked to a 
religious belief.105 Jack Maurice had a deeply-held belief that 
eating meat was morally wrong, but he did not adhere to any 
religion. The Federal Court found a breach of Maurice’s freedom 
of conscience and ordered CSC to provide him with vegetarian 
meals. However, it seems that this decision has not had the 
expected impact at a systemic level. Notably, the decision did not 
lead to a service-wide change to vegetarian meal policy to protect 
this right for affected prisoners.106 
                                                                                                                      
declaration that his rights had been violated, with no order for a change in policy, 
nor any individual redress for Mr. Chan. 
102 Regina Correctional Centre v. Saskatchewan (Dept. of Justice) (1995), 
133 Sask. R. 61, [1995] S.J. No. 350 (Q.B.). The Court found pressing and 
substantial health reasons for banning smoking in prisons.  
103 This freedom has received little attention from courts or commentators. 
An exception is the consideration given to freedom of conscience by Justice 
Wilson in her minority opinion in R. v. Morgentaler (1988), 37 C.C.C. (3d) 449, 
[1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 at paras. 249-54. 
104 Maurice v. Canada (Attorney General), 2002 FCT 69, 210 D.L.R. (4th) 
186, [2002] F.C.J. No. 72 [Maurice]. 
105 The Court did not conduct an Oakes analysis under s. 1 of the Charter, 
but concluded that the Crown had little difficulty accommodating the prisoner’s 
conscientious belief since it already provided vegetarian meals to accommodate 
religious beliefs. 
106 Four years after the Maurice decision, the Correctional Service of 
Canada’s Manual on Religious and Spiritual Accommodation (last updated on 3 
March 2005) simply provides that “CSC is in the process of establishing 
Guidelines for Diets of Conscience which base the evaluation of a request on the 
criteria set out in [the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent freedom of religion 
decision] Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem (2004) … using the same criteria (of 
demonstrating sincerity and consistency of practice).” 
656               U.B.C. LAW REVIEW     VOL. 40:2 
 
E. SUBSECTION 10(B): RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
In addition to the limited section 7 right to counsel in prison 
discipline hearings that has been recognized by the Supreme Court 
of Canada, some lower courts have upheld prisoners’ claims on 
the basis that their subsection 10(b) right to counsel was violated 
in cases of a body cavity search107 and the illegal use of excessive 
force.108 In a recent Federal Court decision, Tracy Curry, a 
prisoner at Grand Valley Institution, was awarded $10,000 in 
damages for negligence and breach of her subsection 10(b) right 
after she was subjected to a body cavity search. The Court found 
that her purported consent to the cavity search was obtained by 
inducement and was therefore invalid. 
Norman MacPherson, a provincial prisoner in New Brunswick 
and an unrepresented litigant, brought a successful habeas corpus 
application after he was strapped face-down on a stretcher with a 
hockey helmet and wire mask over his head for two to three 
hours.109 The Court found that he was treated in this manner as 
punishment for banging on his cell door repeatedly and requesting 
to call a lawyer. The treatment of MacPherson amounted to 
violations of his sections 12 and 9 rights, as well as showing 
“limited recognition of his right to retain and instruct counsel 
under subsection 10(b) of the Charter.”110 The Court found that 
MacPherson had been asking to call a lawyer for at least 40 days 
but had not been permitted to do so. Remedies ordered pursuant to 
subsection 24(1) of the Charter included, notably, a reduction of 
three months from MacPherson’s sentence, as well as an 
exhortation that the provincial Attorney General “consider what 
steps can be taken to ensure that legal aid is readily available to 
inmates of jails in New Brunswick.”111 
                                                          
107 Curry v. Canada, 2006 FC 63, [2006] F.C.J. no. 87 [Curry]. 
108 R. v. MacPherson (1996), 48 C.R. (4th) 122, [1996] N.B.J. No. 182 
[MacPherson cited to N.B.J.]. See Mary Campbell, supra note 26 at 310. 
Campbell notes that this case is the “closest that a litigated remedy has come to 
the Arbour Report recommendation” for a reduction in sentence as a remedy for 
prisoners’ rights violations. 
109 MacPherson, ibid. 
110 Ibid. at para. 56. 
111 Ibid. at para. 59. 
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The judges in these decisions did not analyze subsection 10(b) 
in any detail (or address the language in subsection 10(b) 
providing that the right arises “on arrest or detention”), apparently 
finding the breach of right to counsel plain and obvious on the 
facts. For example, Beaudry J. writes in Curry: 
the defendant’s argument that Grand Valley staff were under no 
obligation to inform the plaintiff of her right to counsel is downright 
unreasonable. A cavity search is one of the most invasive and 
humiliating procedures a human being can be subjected to, and 
everyone should have the right to seek legal advice before consenting 
to it.112 
It appears that Curry also could have been decided on the basis 
of sections 7 or 8, since the Court was clearly of the view that this 
“invasive and humiliating procedure” engaged Tracy Curry’s 
security of the person and reasonable expectation of privacy, while 
the lack of informed consent rendered such a search unreasonable 
and contrary to principles of fundamental justice.113 
F. SUBSECTION 11(H): RIGHT NOT TO BE TRIED AND PUNISHED 
TWICE FOR THE SAME OFFENCE 
The Supreme Court of Canada decided in R. v. Shubley114 that 
prison discipline proceedings for an institutional offence (in 
Shubley’s case, assault) resulting in a punishment of five days in 
solitary confinement on a restricted diet did not attract the 
protection of the subsection 11(h) right not to be tried and 
punished twice for the same offence. When Shubley faced 
criminal charges arising out of the same alleged assault, the Court 
overturned the trial judge’s stay of those charges on subsection 
11(h) grounds. The majority held that penalties such as solitary 
confinement (i.e. placement in a prison within a prison) and the 
loss of earned remission for institutional offences did not amount 
to “true penal consequences” in a manner necessary to attract the 
protection of the right against double jeopardy.115 
                                                          
112 Curry, supra note 107 at para. 22. 
113 Ibid. at para. 22. 
114 R. v. Shubley (1990), 74 C.R. (3d) 1, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 3 [Shubley cited to 
S.C.R.]. 
115 Ibid. at para. 60. 
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Shubley has been characterized as “a sad commentary on how 
the judiciary, sitting in the quiet and removed forum of the 
courtroom, views the institution of imprisonment.”116 In that 
decision, McLachlin J., as she then was, stated for the majority 
that “internal disciplinary proceedings involve neither fines nor 
imprisonment,”117 yet even in pre-Charter decisions such as 
Martineau v. Matsqui Institution Disciplinary Board,118 the 
Supreme Court of Canada had characterized solitary confinement 
as a punitive “prison within a prison” that deprives prisoners of 
their residual liberty interests.119 The Shubley majority shows a 
substantial degree of deference to the Ontario government’s 
characterization of the internal discipline process as informal, 
summary, and therefore, non-criminal, and in the process, fails to 
appreciate the substance of the penal consequences meted out in 
provincial disciplinary hearings through loss of earned remission 
(and consequent lengthening of the sentence) or time spent in a 
“prison within a prison.”120 
                                                          
116 Allan Manson, “Solitary Confinement, Remission and Prison Discipline” 
(1990) 75 C.R. (3d) 356 at 356. Manson goes on to suggest, at 357: 
Underlying the majority judgment in Shubley is an attitude toward 
prisons and prisoners that shows a misappreciation of the coercive 
nature of solitary confinement and remission and the roles which they 
play within the prison environment. The majority judges’ decision not 
to inquire more carefully into the factors of imprisonment does not do 
justice to the expanded function of the judiciary in the post-Charter era. 
117 Shubley, supra note 114 at para. 40. 
118 Martineau v. Matsqui Institution Disciplinary Board (1980), 13 C.R. (3d) 
1, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 602. 
119 Even earlier, the Federal Court in McCann v. Queen, [1976] 1 F.C. 570, 
29 C.C.C. (2d) 337, had declared that the regime of solitary confinement at the 
British Columbia Penitentiary amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. See 
Michael Jackson, Prisoners of Isolation: Solitary Confinement in Canada 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983) at c. 4. 
120 Shubley, supra note 114. The dissenting opinion of Cory J. (with which 
Wilson J. concurred) demonstrates an appreciation of the true nature of penal 
consequences for people already in prison, at para. 8: 
To say that [solitary confinement is not a violation of residual liberties] 
would mean that once convicted an inmate has forfeited all rights and 
could no longer question the validity of any supplementary form of 
punishment. If the inmate can never question the validity of 
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G. SECTION 12: THE RIGHT AGAINST CRUEL AND UNUSUAL 
PUNISHMENT 
While one might have thought that the right not to be subjected to 
any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment would be one of 
the more significant Charter rights for prisoners, the section has 
had remarkably little impact in litigation concerning conditions of 
confinement.121 For example, a number of challenges to the 
practice of double-bunking as cruel and unusual treatment or 
punishment have been dismissed.122 The test applied for a 
violation of section 12 is whether the treatment or punishment is 
“so excessive as to outrage the standards of decency,”123 a test that 
has proved very difficult for prisoners to meet. Most of the 
analytical “work” in Charter claims involving prison conditions is 
done under section 7. However, a notable successful section 12 
case was the MacPherson decision from New Brunswick, 
discussed under subsection 10(b) above, in which a reduced 
sentence was ordered as a remedy for treatment found to be cruel 
and unusual. 
H. SECTION 15: EQUALITY RIGHTS 
The guarantee of equality in section 15 of the Charter, described 
by the Supreme Court of Canada as “the Charter’s conceptually 
most difficult right,”124 has been raised in a few prison cases, 
                                                                                                                      
supplementary punishment, then any form of punishment could be 
justified on the basis that good treatment is only a privilege. 
121 In 1982, Michael Jackson argued that s. 12 should be interpreted in a 
manner that would subject prison conditions to careful scrutiny. See Michael 
Jackson, “Cruel and Unusual Treatment or Punishment?” (1982), U.B.C. L. Rev. 
Charter Edition 189 at 211 where Jackson stated: 
The focusing of s. 12 of the Charter on prison conditions and practices 
would be particularly appropriate given that typically such practices 
and conditions are not specifically prescribed by Parliament but are 
rather applied through the interpretations of very broadly drafted 
legislative provisions which are made specific through administrative 
policy-making. 
122 See e.g. Piche, supra note 79.  
123 Ibid. 
124 Law v. Canada (1999), 170 D.L.R. (4th) 1, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 [Law 
cited to S.C.R.]. 
660               U.B.C. LAW REVIEW     VOL. 40:2 
 
including two that reached that court.125 Beginning with its 
decision in Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia,126 the 
Supreme Court of Canada has adopted a “substantive equality” 
approach to section 15 which has been described succinctly by 
Diana Majury: 
Substantive equality recognizes that in order to further equality, 
policies and practices need to respond to historically and socially 
based differences. Substantive equality looks to the effects of a 
practice or policy to determine its equality impact, recognizing that in 
order to be treated equally, dominant and subordinated groups may 
need to be treated differently.127 
As such, to prove a violation of equality rights, a claimant must 
demonstrate the following:128 (1) that the law or government 
action treated the claimant different than others, by purpose or 
effect; (2) that the differential treatment was based on an 
enumerated129 or analogous130 ground of discrimination; and (3) 
that the differential treatment was discriminatory in a substantive 
sense, considering such factors as pre-existing group disadvantage 
and the nature of the interest affected. 
                                                          
125 Weatherall, supra note 90 (upholding a policy of female correctional 
officers conducting frisk searches and cell surveillance of male prisoners) and 
Sauvé, supra note 2 (a majority of the Court decided the challenge to a prisoner 
voting ban on s. 3 and s. 1 grounds, leaving undecided the question of whether 
“prisoner status” is an analogous ground of discrimination protected by s. 15; the 
dissent would have found no violation of equality rights). 
126 Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia (1989), 34 B.C.L.R. (2d) 
273, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143. 
127 Diana Majury, “The Charter, Equality Rights, and Women: Equivocation 
and Celebration” (2002) 40 Osgoode Hall L.J. 297 at para. 16. 
128 The test articulated here is the one applied by the unanimous Supreme 
Court of Canada in Law and in subsequent cases. The “Law Test” has been the 
subject of much criticism. See e.g. Fay Faraday, Margaret Denike & M. Kate 
Stephenson, eds., Making Equality Rights Real: Securing Substantive Equality 
Under the Charter (Toronto: Irwin, 2006).  
129 The grounds enumerated in s. 15 are race, national or ethnic origin, 
colour, religion, sex age, or mental or physical disability. 
130 Grounds recognized by the Supreme Court to be analogous to the listed 
grounds in s. 15 include citizenship status, marital status, sexual orientation, and 
Aboriginality-residence. 
2007 A PRISONERS’ CHARTER? 
 
 
 
661
1. PRISONER STATUS 
To date, a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada has not 
considered squarely the argument that “prisoner status” is a 
ground of discrimination analogous to those listed in section 15 
and that, therefore, differential treatment of prisoners amounting 
to substantive discrimination violates the equality guarantee. In 
Sauvé, the majority struck down the prisoner voting ban as an 
unjustified infringement of the right to vote, noting that it was 
unnecessary to consider the alternative argument that the law 
violated subsection 15(1).131 However, on behalf of four dissenting 
justices, Gonthier J. took the view that prisoner status is not an 
analogous ground, on the basis that prisoners have been convicted 
of an offence and, therefore, are appropriately treated differently. 
He stated, “[i]n my view, to find prisoner status to be an analogous 
ground would be a distortion of the purpose of subsection 15(1) 
and would come close to making a mockery of the Criminal Code 
and the values on which it is based and which it enshrines.”132 The 
plaintiffs and intervenors in Sauvé, including Aboriginal Legal 
Services of Toronto, the Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry 
Societies and the John Howard Society of Canada, had urged the 
court to view prisoners as a “quintessential discrete and insular 
minority… lacking in political power and vulnerable to having 
their interests overlooked,”133 and noted the overrepresentation of 
Aboriginal, poor and otherwise socially disadvantaged people in 
the prison population.134 
                                                          
131 Sauvé, supra note 2 at para. 63. The trial and Court of Appeal decisions 
in Sauvé had rejected the s. 15 claim. See also Jackson v. Joyceville Penitentiary, 
[1990] 3 F.C. 55, 55 C.C.C. (3d) 50 (T.D.) similarly rejecting a s. 15 argument 
about prisoner status. 
132 Sauvé, ibid. at para. 201. 
133 Ibid. (Factum of the Intervenor at paras. 22-23), online: Aboriginal Legal 
Services of Toronto <http://www.aboriginallegal.ca/docs/sauve.factum.final. 
htm>. 
134 Sauvé, supra note 2 (Expert Evidence of Professor Michael Jackson at 
35-53, on file with author). 
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2. ENUMERATED AND ANALOGOUS GROUNDS OF 
DISCRIMINATION 
Women prisoners have long been considered “too few to 
count,”135 representing just ten percent of those in provincial jail 
and six percent of those serving federal time.136 As such, they have 
often been disadvantaged in a system designed for the vast 
majority of prisoners who are men, a reality chronicled in stark 
detail in numerous reports and commissions of inquiry.137 It is 
therefore interesting that the only sex discrimination case in the 
prison context to reach the Supreme Court of Canada was one 
involving the treatment of male prisoners. In Weatherall v. 
Canada,138 the Supreme Court of Canada upheld a CSC policy 
permitting female correctional officers to work on the front lines 
in men’s prisons, including conducting frisk searches and cell 
surveillance. La Forest J. noted that men were treated differently 
than women (the evidence indicated that, at the time, men were 
subjected to frisk searches by female guards while women 
prisoners were not subjected to frisk searches by male guards).139 
However, the “historical, biological and sociological differences 
between men and women,” including “that the historical trend of 
violence perpetrated by men against women is not matched by a 
comparable trend pursuant to which men are victims and women 
                                                          
135 Ellen Adelberg & Claudia Currie, eds., Too Few to Count: Canadian 
Women in Conflict with the Law (Vancouver: Press Gang, 1987). 
136 Beattie, supra note 35. 
137 See e.g. Task Force on Federally Sentenced Women, Creating Choices: 
Report of the Task Force on Federally Sentenced Women (Ottawa: Ministry of 
the Solicitor General, 1990); Arbour, supra note 9; Canadian Human Rights 
Commission, supra note 11. 
138 Weatherall, supra note 90. 
139 It should be noted that the CSC’s current “gender-neutral staffing policy” 
means that there are men employed in front-line positions in all the regional 
women’s prisons, despite a recommendation to the contrary made by the CSC 
contracted Cross Gender Monitor. See Thérèse LaJeunesse et al., The Cross 
Gender Monitoring Project Federally Sentenced Women’s Facilities: Third and 
Final Report (Ottawa, Correction Service Canada, 2000), online: Thérèse 
Lajeunesse and Associates <http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/text/prgrm/fsw/gender3/ 
toc_e.shtml#TopOfPage>. For a discussion of the human rights issues at stake in 
cross-gender staffing in women’s prisons, see Canadian Human Rights 
Commission, supra note 11 at 42-44. 
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the aggressors,” meant that this differential treatment was not 
necessarily discriminatory in a substantive sense.140 
The few equality claims brought by women prisoners have met 
with mixed success in lower courts, although many issues have yet 
to be addressed in litigation.141 Until the mid-1990s, all federally 
sentenced women in Canada served their time at the Prison for 
Women in Kingston (“P4W”),142 which meant much greater 
geographic isolation from family and community supports relative 
to federally sentenced men, a reality compounded by the fact that 
more women than men are the primary caregivers of children.143 A 
claim by Gayle Horii,144 a federally sentenced woman from British 
                                                          
140 Weatherall, supra note 90 at 873. But see Turner v. Burnaby 
Correctional Centre for Women, [1994] B.C.J. No. 1430 (S.C.) (rejecting an 
equality-based claim by a federally sentenced woman that she should be 
permitted to have her newborn child with her in prison as part of the existing 
mother-child program. The Court noted that federally sentenced men did not 
have this opportunity, but did not consider the social reality of differences 
between men and women in relation to childbearing and primary responsibility 
for childrearing). 
141 See generally Canadian Human Rights Commission, supra note 11 and 
Debra Parkes & Kim Pate, “Time for Accountability: Effective Oversight of 
Women’s Prisons” (2006) 48 Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal 
Justice 251. 
142 Due to the 1997 court action to prevent the opening of the 34-bed 
women’s unit at Kingston Penitentiary for men, discussed infra, text 
accompanying notes 146-47, a handful of women were still in P4W into the late 
1990s. The last woman left in 2000. 
143 In her 1996 Report, Justice Arbour, supra note 9 at 200 noted: 
Women [at P4W] also served their sentences in harsher conditions than 
men because of their smaller numbers. They have suffered greater 
family dislocation, because there are so few options for the 
imprisonment of women. They have been overclassified, or in any 
event, they have been detained in a facility that does not correspond to 
their classification. For the same reasons, they have been offered fewer 
programs than men. … They have no significant vocational training 
opportunities. 
144 Gayle Horii has been a strong activist on behalf of prisoners’ rights and 
social justice, both during her incarceration and while on parole. Her activities 
include co-founding the advocacy group Strength in Sisterhood and writing 
various journal articles such as Gayle Horii, “The Art In/Of Survival” (1994) 5(2) 
Journal of Prisoners on Prisons 10 and Gayle Horii, “Processing Humans” in 
Kelly Hannah-Moffat & Margaret Shaw, eds., An Ideal Prison? Critical Essays 
on Women’s Imprison in Canada (Halifax: Fernwood, 2000) at 104. 
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Columbia, that being incarcerated at P4W amounted to 
discrimination on the basis of sex was never heard on the 
merits.145 However, Horii did serve some of her time at a men’s 
prison in B.C. on humanitarian grounds (her husband was 
seriously ill) and the case ultimately settled out-of-court. 
Similarly, the equality issues raised in a habeas corpus 
application146 by a group of women prisoners who were scheduled 
for transfer from P4W to a segregated maximum security unit 
inside Kingston Penitentiary (a men’s prison) were never 
addressed on their merits. Shortly after the Ontario Court of 
Appeal affirmed that the women’s habeas corpus application 
could proceed (and after the Ontario Superior Court had ordered 
that the women not be transferred in the interim), the Correctional 
Service of Canada agreed in a consent order not to operate a 
maximum security unit for women at Kingston Penitentiary. The 
women who had been scheduled for the transfer were all 
reclassified to be medium security prisoners, either while the court 
case was pending or during the ensuing two and a half years (i.e. 
by the time P4W was closed). While this was a positive result in 
Ontario, the reality was that at that time, women classified as 
maximum security prisoners were being housed in segregated 
units in men’s prisons in Saskatchewan, Quebec, and Nova 
Scotia.147 Obtaining a systemic or broad-based remedy that cannot 
be circumvented remains a challenge in the correctional context. 
Equality rights may involve intersecting grounds of 
discrimination such as, for example, sex and race, in the 
experience of Aboriginal women prisoners. In R. v. Daniels, a 
                                                          
145 See Horii v. Canada (Commissioner of Corrections) (1991), 7 Admin. 
L.R. (2d) 1, [1992] 1 F.C. 142 (C.A.) (granting Horii’s application for an 
interlocutory injunction to prevent her transfer to P4W). 
146 See Beaudry v. Canada (Commissioner of Corrections), [1997] O.J. No. 
5082 (C.A.) (dismissing an appeal by the Commissioner of Corrections from a 
decision that the women were entitled to seek relief by way of habeas corpus 
although the transfer had not yet been effected). 
147 Submission of the Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies to the 
Canadian Human Rights Commission for the Special Report on the 
Discrimination on the Basis of Sex, Race and Disability Faced by Federally 
Sentenced Women (Ottawa: Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies, 
2003) at 32, online: CAEFS <http://www.elizabethfry.ca/submissn/specialr/1. 
htm>.  
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1990 sentencing decision involving an Aboriginal woman from 
Saskatchewan, Carol Daniels, it was successfully argued that 
serving her sentence at P4W would amount to a violation of her 
sections 15, 28, 7, and 12 Charter rights.148 The recent deaths of 
six Aboriginal women by suicide at P4W, combined with the 
geographic dislocation and dearth of programs at the prison led 
Wedge J. to conclude that discrimination against Aboriginal 
women such as Carol Daniels was inevitable. While Daniels was 
overturned on appeal on jurisdictional grounds, and while P4W 
has since been closed and replaced with five regional prisons for 
women and the Okimaw Ohci Healing Lodge (the latter being 
available to less than one third of federally sentenced Aboriginal 
women), a number of the issues faced by Aboriginal women 
prisoners may be ripe for an equality rights challenge.149 In 
addition, advocates for women prisoners and for Aboriginal 
women have demonstrated an intention to take these issues outside 
Canada to the international human rights arena,150 a strategy that 
has worked to raise awareness in other cases of discrimination 
experienced by Aboriginal women.151 
                                                          
148 R. v. Daniels, [1990] 4 C.N.L.R. 51 (Sask. Q.B.), rev’d on procedural 
grounds: (1991) 65 C.C.C. (3d) 366 (Sask. C.A.). 
149 See Patricia Monture-Angus, The Lived Experience of Aboriginal Women 
Who Are Federally Sentenced, Submission of the Canadian Association of 
Elizabeth Fry Societies to the Canadian Human Rights Commission (Ottawa: 
Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies, 2002), online: CAEFS 
<http://www.elizabethfry.ca/submissn/aborigin/aborigin.pdf>. See also, Cheryl 
Webster and Anthony Doob, “Classification without Validity or Equity: An 
Empirical Examination of the Custody Rating Scale for Federally Sentenced 
Women Offenders in Canada” (2004) 46 Canadian Journal of Criminology and 
Criminal Justice 395. 
150 Gayle Horii, Debra Parkes & Kim Pate, “Are Women’s Rights Worth the 
Paper They’re Written On? Collaborating to Enforce the Human Rights of 
Criminalized Women” in Elizabeth Comack & Gillian Balfour, eds., 
Criminalizing Women: Gender and (In)justice in Neo-Liberal Times (Halifax: 
Fernwood, 2006) at 318-19. 
151 For example, Sandra Lovelace, a Maliseet woman, successfully argued 
before the United Nations Human Rights Commission that the discriminatory 
treatment of Aboriginal women under the Indian Act breached Canada’s 
obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
eventually leading the Canadian government to amend the Indian Act to remove 
some, but not all, of the discriminatory treatment. See Anne Bayefsky, “The 
Human Rights Committee and the Case of Sandra Lovelace” (1982) 20 Can. Y.B. 
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Equality claims have also been brought by gay prisoners. In 
1989, six years before the Supreme Court of Canada’s holding in 
Egan v. Canada152 that sexual orientation is an analogous ground 
of discrimination protected by section 15, Timothy Veysey 
successfully argued at trial that the CSC’s private family visiting 
policy discriminated against him on the basis of his sexual 
orientation by being limited to married or common law spouses.153 
The Federal Court of Appeal ultimately decided the case in 
Veysey’s favour, but on the basis that the existing policy actually 
did not exclude same-sex partners. The Court held that since they 
could be included within an expansive definition of “common law 
partners,” the issue was not whether the existing policy was under 
inclusive, but in the Commissioner of Corrections’ application of 
that policy in refusing to exercise his discretion. On the other 
hand, an equality rights claim by another federally sentenced gay 
man based on the denial of his request for a private family visit 
with his cellmate was dismissed.154 The case was not substantively 
considered as a section 15 case; rather, it was dismissed on the 
basis that the definition of “visitor” simply excluded other 
prisoners.155 Unfortunately for prisoners, the CSC interpreted this 
decision in an expansive way to mean that no prisoner could be 
eligible for any visit with another prisoner, including those in 
other institutions, which has meant that sisters, brothers, parents, 
and partners (same-sex or opposite sex) are barred from visiting 
one another. 
                                                                                                                      
Int’l L. 244 and Native Women’s Association of Canada, Guide to Bill C-31 
(Ohsweken, Ontario: Native Women’s Association of Canada, 1986), online: 
Native Women’s Association of Canada <http://www.nwac-hq.org/documents/ 
GuidetoBillC31.pdf>. 
152 Egan v. Canada (1995), 12 R.F.L. (4th) 201, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513. 
153 Veysey v. Canada (Commissioner of the Correctional Service), [1990] 1 
F.C. 321, [1989] F.C.J. No. 1013 (T.D.), varied by (1990), 43 Admin. L.R. 316 
(Fed. C.A.). 
154 Laliberté v. Canada (Correctional Service) (2000), 181 F.T.R. 276, 
[2000] F.C.J. No. 548 (T.D.). 
155 Ibid. 
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IV. BARRIERS AND BREAKTHROUGHS IN PRISONER 
LITIGATION 
There have been a number challenges brought under section 15 
and other Charter rights that have failed at least in part due to the 
difficulties of marshalling the evidence necessary to prove a claim. 
These unsuccessful challenges have included, for example, claims 
of discrimination on the basis of race due to a lack of sufficient 
evidence156 or claims that had been poorly framed157 (often by 
unrepresented litigants or counsel inexperienced with prison or 
Charter law). Occasionally, self-represented prisoners are 
successful,158 which is remarkable given the challenges they face. 
There are few lawyers who represent prisoners at all, a reality that 
is not surprising given the lack of legal aid funding for prison 
cases in most provinces. Fewer still have developed expertise in 
the area. 
Furthermore, the kind of evidence that would be required to 
prove systemic discrimination against, for example, Aboriginal 
prisoners (e.g. on the basis that they are over-classified as 
maximum security prisoners) is substantial and would be 
expensive to gather. It is for this reason that the Canadian 
Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies has advocated a “Prisoner 
Court Challenges Fund” to fill this access to justice gap.159 An 
additional barrier to mounting a successful legal proceeding in the 
prison context, whether based on the Charter or not, is the reality 
                                                          
156 See e.g. Crowe v. Canada (1993), 63 F.T.R. 177, [1993] F.C.J. No. 424 
(T.D.) (dismissing, for lack of evidence, a claim by an Aboriginal man alleging 
that systemic discrimination against Aboriginal prisoners meant that they were 
less likely than non-Aboriginal prisoners to be granted escorted temporary 
absences). 
157 See e.g. Schemmann v. Canada (Correctional Service) (1995), 96 F.T.R. 
154, [1995] F.C.J. No. 786 (T.D.) (where an unrepresented prisoner challenged a 
rule making him ineligible for accelerated parole review on the basis that he was 
discriminated against due to the nature of his offence, being incest). 
158 See e.g. Maurice, supra note 104, concerning freedom of conscience, 
wherein Jack Maurice won the right to a vegetarian meal for non-religious moral 
reasons. 
159 Parkes & Pate, supra note 141 at 276. This proposal for a Prisoner Court 
Challenges Fund was modelled on the former Court Challenges Program, which 
was abolished in 2006, but had provided limited funding for equality and 
language rights Charter challenges to federal laws. 
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that much of the research on prisons is commissioned by the 
CSC160 or provincial corrections departments, which makes it 
difficult to find experts who might be willing and able to testify on 
behalf of prisoners in such cases.161 
A further challenge is mootness. Often the circumstances 
facing a prisoner litigant, such as reclassification to maximum 
security or placement in segregation, have ended before a trial or 
other court proceeding can be heard. The prisoner may even have 
been released from incarceration, as is often the case with 
provincial prisoners, whether sentenced or in remand custody. For 
example, in Allard v. Nanaimo Correctional Centre,162 decisions 
of the provincial jail’s disciplinary board were quashed due to 
breaches of natural justice that the B.C. Supreme Court labeled 
“egregious.”163 However, the underlying issue concerning the 
constitutionality of the provincial disciplinary process (primarily 
that it lacked independent adjudication and procedural protections) 
was considered moot. The facts in this case point to the relative 
ease with which a prisoners’ case can be rendered moot. The 
Court noted that after the judicial review petition was filed, and 
after the prison respondents had received legal advice, they 
reinstated the twenty days loss of remission, meaning that Allard’s 
                                                          
160 See the substantial body of reports and other publications commissioned 
or produced by the Research Branch of the Correctional Service of Canada, 
online: Correctional Service Canada <http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/text/research_e 
.shtml>. 
161 See e.g. Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies, Executive 
Director’s Annual Report 2004-2005 (Ottawa: Canadian Association of Elizabeth 
Fry Societies, 2005) at 11, online: CAEFS <http://www.elizabethfry.ca/areport/ 
2004-05/english/ed.pdf> where Kim Pate relates a situation in which CAEFS felt 
compelled to withdraw as an intervenor in an inquest into a death in custody of a 
woman prisoner in Ontario. The scheduled expert witness indicated within one 
working day of the commencement of the inquest that she could not speak to 
many of the issues outlined in her witness statement after CAEFS’ lawyer was 
contacted by counsel for the CSC. Similarly, other psychologists and 
psychiatrists had refused to testify against CSC for fear that they would 
jeopardize service delivery contracts and/or access to the prison(s) for women to 
conduct their research. 
162 Allard, supra note 61. 
163 See facts discussed supra, text accompanying notes 61-62.  
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release date was recalculated to just two days before the judicial 
review hearing date.164 The Court further noted: 
Counsel for the Petitioner had tried since January 2000 to have the 
Respondents file material so this matter could be set for hearing. 
There was some delay by the Respondents in complying. The 
Respondents however through counsel, indicated by early April a 
willingness to discuss “resolution of the issues”. In early May counsel 
met and discussed resolution and the Respondent's counsel was to 
“seek instructions from her clients” in regard to matters discussed. On 
June 9, 2000 the Petitioner advised his counsel that his Release date 
was July 1, 2000 and he wished to have the matter set down before 
his release date so the matter could be determined before that time to 
benefit him and all others who might be similarly affected.165 
It was only after the matter was set down for 23 June 2000 that 
Allard was advised that his release date had been recalculated to 
21 June 2000. Despite the argument by counsel for Allard that 
given the short-term nature of provincial incarceration, this issue 
was likely to evade review indefinitely, the Court was reluctant to 
“impinge on a legislative function” when, in its view, there was no 
continuing live controversy.166 
Nevertheless, some courts have taken a broader view and 
chosen to find an ongoing live controversy in prison cases, even 
where the prisoners have been released. For example, when faced 
with a motion to dismiss a Charter challenge to conditions at the 
Edmonton Remand Centre because the prisoner plaintiffs had been 
released (the charges against them having been stayed), both the 
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench and Court of Appeal refused to 
grant the motion to dismiss.167 The Court at first instance had 
considered the matter moot, but exercised its discretion to allow 
the case to proceed in any event, demonstrating insight into the 
problems faced by prisoner litigants: 
An application for release from disciplinary segregation may be 
evasive of judicial review because the question is moot as soon as the 
inmate is released. Similarly, an application to quash the order of a 
                                                          
164 Allard, supra note 61 at paras. 17-18. 
165 Ibid. at paras. 22-23. 
166 Ibid. at para. 40. 
167 Trang Alta. Q.B., supra note 89; Trang C.A. supra note 89. 
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disciplinary hearing may be moot, if the decision is voluntarily set 
aside. In practice, if every application for Charter relief from 
conditions at the ERC is dismissed because the applicant has been 
released, the question as to whether or not his or her incarceration 
was in breach of the Charter will remain forever evasive of review.168 
However, the Court of Appeal went one step further and said 
that the issue was simply not moot, stating “[t]here is clearly a live 
controversy between the parties as to whether or not the 
respondents' Charter rights were breached while they were 
incarcerated.”169 This case may serve as a useful precedent in 
other prisoner court challenges, given the Court’s apparent finding 
that release from custody does not mean the end of a “live 
controversy” about Charter breaches during incarceration.170 
Of the prisoners’ Charter claims that do make it to court, many 
continue to be met with a deferential, “hands off” approach at 
various stages of the Charter analysis. Courts tend to characterize 
prison rules and decisions as “administrative” decisions subject to 
a deferential standard of review under the Charter. Instead of 
understanding these decisions as analogous to classic criminal 
ones that require more cogent justification for state limits on rights 
due to the imbalance of power between individual citizens and the 
state, prison officials are often accorded deference by courts, 
particularly when it is alleged that “safety” or “security” is at 
stake.171 The cases reveal a tendency to consider issues of 
government justification for limiting rights at the stage of deciding 
whether there has been an infringement of the right itself, rather 
than at the subsequent section 1 stage. A notable example is 
Fieldhouse v. Canada where both the trial and appeal decisions 
held that a random urinalysis policy breached neither section 7 nor 
section 8 rights of federal prisoners.172 Since no violation was 
found, neither court proceeded to consider section 1 of the Charter 
                                                          
168 Trang Alta. Q.B., ibid. at para. 73. 
169 Trang C.A., supra note 89 at para. 5. 
170 Ibid. at para. 51. 
171 It was predicted in the early days of the Charter that s. 1 would play a 
significant role in limiting the effect of the Charter to expand and protect 
prisoners’ rights. See e.g. MacKay, supra note 57 at 699. 
172 Fieldhouse v. Canada (1994), 33 C.R. (4th) 346, [1994] B.C.J. 1807 
(S.C.), aff’d by (1995), 40 C.R. (4th) 263, [1995] B.C.J. No. 975 (C.A.). 
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to assess whether the government had adequate justification for 
instituting this policy. Instead, both levels of court considered the 
government’s objectives and justifications for instituting random 
urinalysis as part of a truncated section 7 analysis and the 
“reasonableness” analysis in section 8.173 
There is little doubt that the Court in Fieldhouse would have 
concluded that combating the problems associated with drug use 
in prisons (including the potential for drug-related assaults, 
intimidation, overdoses, and pressure on visiting family members 
to import drugs) is a pressing and substantial objective. However, 
section 1 justification requires more than a good objective; it 
requires, among other things, that the measure chosen to achieve 
the objective only minimally impair Charter rights. The decision 
in Sauvé is, therefore, instructive for the stringent approach taken 
by the majority to each stage of the government’s attempted 
Charter justification of prisoner disenfranchisement. For example, 
in rejecting the argument that a ban on federal prisoners voting is 
even rationally connected to the objective of “enhancing the 
criminal sanction,” the Chief Justice strongly supported the notion 
of prisoners as rights-bearing citizens: 
Indeed, the remedy of imprisonment for a term rather than permanent 
exile implies our acceptance of continued membership in the social 
order. Certain rights are justifiably limited for penal reasons, 
including aspects of the rights to liberty, security of the person, 
mobility, and security against search and seizure. But whether a right 
is justifiably limited cannot be determined by observing that an 
offender has, by his or her actions, withdrawn from the social 
compact. Indeed, the right of the state to punish and the obligation of 
the criminal to accept punishment are tied to society’s acceptance of 
the criminal as a person with rights and responsibilities.174 
                                                          
173Allan Manson has criticized this approach, saying that the balancing of 
rights and societal interests is properly conducted at the s. 1 stage (when the 
burden is on the government) and that such an analysis is inconsistent with other 
criminal law cases (e.g. the “random stop” cases based on s. 9 of the Charter, 
such as R. v. Hufsky (1988), 63 C.R. (3d) 14, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 621). See Allan 
Manson, “Fieldhouse and the Diminution of Charter Scrutiny” (1994) 33 C.R. 
(4th) 358. 
174 Sauvé, supra note 2 at para. 47. 
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This approach arguably sets a new tone for prisoner litigation 
under the Charter, yet it cannot be ignored that the case concerned 
the quintessential civil and political right, the right to vote, rather 
than a right that would have implicated the prison’s quest for 
“good order” and institutional security, as do many other Charter 
cases. 
It is for this and other reasons that the subsequent decision of 
the Supreme Court of Canada in May v. Ferndale Institution175 is 
so remarkable. When read in light of Sauvé, the May decision may 
signal a further step away from the deferential approach to prison 
decision-making and a muted view of prisoners’ rights. May was 
not a Charter case; rather, it was a decision about the availability 
and scope of habeas corpus review in provincial superior court to 
challenge correctional decisions that deprive prisoners of their 
residual liberty interests. 
May is significant for at least three reasons. First, the Supreme 
Court unanimously and unequivocally affirmed the right of 
prisoners to go to superior court on habeas corpus, thereby 
overturning a line of authority in provincial appellate courts which 
had held that habeas corpus review is not available to federal 
prisoners except in limited circumstances.176 Second, in the course 
of its decision that habeas corpus must be available to federal 
prisoners, the Court bolstered the case for enhanced judicial 
oversight of prisoners by describing the internal grievance 
procedure to be woefully inadequate to protect their fundamental 
rights and interests. LeBel and Fish JJ. noted the following 
“structural weaknesses” in the federal grievance procedure: 
the internal grievance process set out in the CCRA prescribes the 
review of decisions made by prison authorities by other prison 
authorities. Thus, in a case where the legality of a Commissioner’s 
policy is contested, it cannot be reasonably expected that the 
decision-maker, who is subordinate to the Commissioner, could fairly 
and impartially decide the issue. It is also noteworthy that there are 
no remedies set out in the CCRA and its regulations and no articulated 
                                                          
175 May v. Ferndale Institution, 2005 SCC 82, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 809, 261 
D.L.R. (4th) 541 [May S.C.C. cited to S.C.R.]. 
176 See e.g. Spindler v. Millhaven Institution (2003), 175 O.A.C. 251, [2003] 
O.J. No. 3449 (C.A.) and the B.C. Court of Appeal decision in May v. Ferndale 
(2003), 308 W.A.C. 23, [2003] B.C.J. No. 2294. 
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grounds upon which grievances may be reviewed. Lastly, the 
decisions with respect to grievances are not legally enforceable.177 
The court went on to say, 
[affirming the availability of habeas corpus for federal prisoners] 
properly recognizes the importance of affording prisoners a 
meaningful and significant access to justice in order to protect their 
liberty rights, a Charter value. Timely judicial oversight, in which 
provincial superior courts must play a concurrent if not predominant 
role, is still necessary to safeguard the human rights and civil liberties 
of prisoners, and to ensure that the rule of law applies within 
penitentiary walls.178 
Finally, a majority of the Court found the instant decision— 
reclassifying Terry May and others from minimum to medium 
security—to be arbitrary and therefore illegal.179 Classification 
decisions are about institutional security writ large and courts have 
tended to defer to correctional officials in such cases. This was not 
so in May where LeBel and Fish JJ., on behalf of the majority, 
found the correctional authorities’ refusal to disclose the “scoring 
matrix” for reclassification and transfer decision to the applicants 
and to the Court at first instance to be misleading and “highly 
objectionable.”180 Recognizing the inappropriateness of reflexive 
deference to correctional decision-making,181 the majority seemed 
to grasp the difficulties faced by prisoner litigants in challenging 
the actions of authorities who hold all the power and much of the 
relevant evidence. 
V. LOOKING AHEAD: PRISONERS’ RIGHTS IN LAW AND 
ORDER TIMES 
In 1996, Justice Arbour made a compelling case in her Report into 
Certain Events at the Prison for Women in Kingston that without 
                                                          
177 May S.C.C., supra note 175 at para. 63 [emphasis in original]. 
178 Ibid. at para. 72. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Ibid. at paras. 109-110. 
181 On the flip side, the dissenting judges show a significant degree of 
deference to the CSC in deciding the scope of disclosure to prisoners facing 
reclassification and involuntary transfer, as well as in making the “individual 
assessment” to transfer each prisoner.  
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an effective sanction for breaches of the law, the Rule of Law will 
never fully take hold within prisons.182 She urged the 
empowerment of judges to reduce a prisoner’s sentence when it 
has been proven that the sentence was rendered more punitive than 
the one intended due to “illegalities, gross mismanagement or 
unfairness in the administration of a sentence.”183 The possibilities 
and some limitations associated with this proposed remedy have 
been explored elsewhere,184 but the key strength of the 
recommendation is that it provides a meaningful sanction and 
remedy for rights abuses, one that may provide an incentive for 
compliance with the law along the lines of the Charter subsection 
24(2) remedy for the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence from 
a criminal trial. 
In a media interview in May 2006, a month after the ten year 
anniversary of the release of her report, Louise Arbour, now 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, expressed 
disappointment that the recommendation for judicial oversight had 
been shelved.185 The current Conservative government in Ottawa 
is even less likely than its predecessor to implement any 
legislative change to provide a remedy for prisoners’ rights 
claims.186 Meanwhile, with the exception of the MacPherson case 
discussed above, courts to date have not been keen to reduce 
prison sentences as a remedy for rights violations. However, in the 
sentencing context, some courts are willing to order that time 
spent in pre-trial custody be credited as triple or even quadruple 
                                                          
182 Arbour, supra note 9. 
183 Ibid. at 183. 
184 See Parkes & Pate, supra note 141; Mary Campbell, supra note 26; Allan 
Manson, “Scrutiny from the Outside: The Arbour Commission, the Prison for 
Women and the Correctional Service of Canada” (1996) 1 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 
321. 
185 Kirk Makin, “Decade after inquiry, prisons still failing women, Arbour 
says” The Globe and Mail (13 May 2006) A9. 
186 The Conservative government’s first Minister of Justice, Vic Toews, was 
a most vocal opponent of prisoners’ rights while in opposition. For example, in 
expressing his disgust with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Sauvé, that affirmed 
prisoners’ voting rights, Toews went so far as to advocate a constitutional 
amendment to s. 3 of the Charter which provides that “every citizen has the right 
to vote… .” See Janice Tibbetts, “Conservatives pledge to take away prisoners’ 
right to vote” Canwest News Service (20 June 2004). 
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time to redress the harshness of overcrowded and inhumane 
conditions,187 and periods of arbitrary detention,188 as well as time 
spent in pre-trial protective custody189 or effective segregation for 
women prisoners.190 The federal Correctional Investigator, as well 
as various other bodies at the provincial and federal level, continue 
to chronicle a range of events in this country’s prisons and jails 
that cry out for independent review within a human rights 
framework. These realities include unauthorized uses of force, a 
lack of available process for reviewing administrative segregation, 
and woefully inadequate complaints procedures, all areas where 
the Charter has not meaningfully penetrated the walls of Canadian 
prisons.191 Subection 24(1) of the Charter empowers a judge who 
has found a breach of a prisoner’s Charter rights to order a 
remedy that she or he “considers just and appropriate in the 
circumstances.” With the lack of legislative attention to calls for 
independent oversight and effective remedies for violating 
prisoners’ rights, the second quarter century of Charter litigation 
may see courts emboldened to take a greater role at the remedial 
stage, including using the “Arbour remedy” to reduce a sentence 
of imprisonment in appropriate cases. 
To be sure, the courts alone cannot ensure that a “Charter 
culture” prevails in Canadian prisons. In fact, experience has 
taught us that effective oversight and accountability of prisons is 
extremely difficult to put in place, perhaps due to the nature of 
imprisonment itself which arguably represents the very antithesis 
of fundamental values such as liberty and human dignity. The 
difficulty of making prisons humane and effectively overseen 
should encourage us to seriously consider the need to reduce our 
society’s reliance on imprisonment and to think creatively about 
                                                          
187 R. v. Permesar, [2003] O.J. 5420 (Prov. Ct.). 
188 R. v. Ichikawa, [2004] O.J. 5537 (Prov. Ct.). 
189 R. v. Coombs, 2003 ABQB 818, [2003] A.J. 1209. 
190 R. v. Bennett, [1993] O.J. 892 (Gen. Div.). 
191 I have argued elsewhere that independent adjudication of prisoners’ 
complaints by a specialized tribunal is not an effective substitute for a more 
accessible and enhanced form of judicial oversight of prisons (including the 
availability of the remedy proposed by Justice Arbour of a reduction in the 
prisoners’ sentence for illegalities and rights violations). See Parkes & Pate, 
supra note 141.  
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more productive responses to crime and its myriad causes.192 That 
is the bigger picture that we would do well to keep in focus. That 
larger vision, including a healthy scepticism about the ability of 
prisons to deliver on the promise of a safer and more secure 
society, is consistent with a plea for greater oversight and 
accountability of our existing prisons. Prisoners must have 
meaningful access to courts as a last resort and effective sanction, 
not for peanut butter litigation, but to ensure that the rights 
enshrined in the Charter are applied to “everyone” and not just 
“everyone except prisoners.” 
 
                                                          
192 See generally Ruth Morris, Penal Abolition: The Practical Choice 
(Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press Inc., 1995). 
